Florida Law Review
Volume 40

Issue 4

Article 3

September 1988

The Trouble With Interest: Reflections on Interest Deductions
After the Tax Reform Act of 1986
Cheryl D. Block

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Cheryl D. Block, The Trouble With Interest: Reflections on Interest Deductions After the Tax Reform Act of
1986, 40 Fla. L. Rev. 689 (1988).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol40/iss4/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Block: The Trouble With Interest: Reflections on Interest Deductions Aft

THE TROUBLE WITH INTEREST:
REFLECTIONS ON INTEREST DEDUCTIONS
AFTER THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986
Cheryl D. Block*
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION

...........................

THE TROUBLE WITH INTEREST ..................

693

A.

693

ProblemsRelated to the ProperDefinitionof Income
1. Tax Treatment of Interest Under the Haig-Simons
Ideal .............................
2. Is Interest a "Cost" Necessarily Deductible in
Arriving at Net Income? ....................

B.

693
696

Gaps in the Tax Base Contributingto the Trouble
With Interest............................. 699
1. Intra-Taxpayer Gaps ...................
a. Tax-Exempt Interest Recipients ...........
b. Borrowing Between Related Taxpayers .......
2. Individual Taxpayer Measurement Flaws: The
Problem of Rate Arbitrage ..................
a. In General .......................
b. Conflicting Views ......................
c. Investments Yielding Tax-Exempt Income ...
i) Statutorily Exempt Income ............
ii) Imputed Income ....................
d. Failure to Tax Unrealized Appreciation .....
i) In General .......................
ii) 'Borrowing Out" Against Appreciated
Property ......................
a.) Individual Taxpayers .............
b.) Corporate Taxpayers .............
e. Capital Gains .....................
f. Accelerated Deductions ..................
g. Problems With Basis ...................
3. Pure Time Arbitrage Problems: Capitalization Rules
4. Interest in the Corporate Setting .............

III.

690

699
699
700
701
701
702
704
704
704
705
705
706
706
709
711
711
714
714
715

TREATMENT OF INTEREST EXPENSE IN THE NEW

WORLD .................................

716

*Associate Professor of Law, the George Washington University National Law Center. The
author would like to thank Charlotte Crane, Louis Del Cotto, Reed Shuldiner, Lewis Solomon,
Theodore Sims, and Victor Thuronyi for their helpful comments on an earlier draft and Deborah
Forbes, Robert Goulder, and Virginia Ward for their helpful research assistance.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1988

1

Florida Law
Vol.
40,REVIEW
Iss. 4 [1988],
UNIVERSITY
OFReview,
FLORIDA
LAW

A.

B.

IV.

V.

Art. 3

Development of Limitations on InterestDeductibility
1. Complete Disallowance Provisions: Congressional
Response to Tax-Exempt Income ...........
a. Statutorily-Exempt Income .............
b. Imputed Income .....................
2. Deferral Provisions ......................
a. Investment Interest Limitations: Response
to Tax Arbitrage From Unrealized Appreciation
and Capital Gains Rates ..............
b. At Risk Rules: Response to Arbitrage
From Accelerated Depreciation, Capital
Gains Rates, and Use of Full Cost Basis ....
c. Passive Loss Rules: Further Response
to Arbitrage From Accelerated Depreciation,
Capital Gains Rates, and Use of Full Cost Basis
d. Uniform Capitalization Rules: Response
to Time Arbitrage ..................
3. Summary ............................
Allocation of Interest Expense in the New World.
1. The Options ...........................
a. Pro Rata Allocation ..................
b. Collateral or Security Method .............
c. Priority System ......................
d. Tracing Method ......................
2. The New Section 163 Regulations .............
a. Tracing Rules .......................
b. Coordination Rules ....................
c. Critique ...........................
i) Complexity ......................
ii) Manipulation .....................
iii) Inconsistency ....................

[Vol. 40

716
716
716
720
722
722
723
724
726
728
728
728
728
733
734
736
736
736
738
739
739
740
741

ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE TREATMENT OF
INTEREST IN THE NEW WORLD ..................

742

A.
B.

742

Sheltering Left Untouched ...................
Movement Toward a Cash-Flow Treatment of
Borrowing ..............................

CONCLUSION .............................
I.

745
751

INTRODUCTION

From the beginning, the federal income tax system has allowed
deductions for interest expense incurred in connection with indebtedness.' Long ago, taxpayers with access to sophisticated tax planning
1. Pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1913, all interest expense was deductible by the payor and
interest income was generally included in the recipients gross income. Revenue Act of 1913,
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advice discovered the advantages of leveraging to acquire property
the income from which was excluded from or delayed in its inclusion
in the tax base, or subject to tax at lower rates. Investing in such
assets gave the taxpayer current interest deductions against ordinary
income, while income from the asset purchased with borrowed funds
was "tax-preferred."2 As numerous commentators remarked, investment in such tax-preferred assets with borrowed funds was so advan'3
tageous for some taxpayers that it created for them a "negative tax."
Leveraging thus takes advantage of gaps in the tax base.
Despite recent reforms enacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
the income tax base still retains many gaps. Perhaps the most dramatic
gap is the failure to include in current income unrealized gains resulting
from yearly appreciation. In addition, several Code provisions still
provide taxpayers with deductions and credits in advance of receipt
of income generated by related investments, thus permitting deferral
in reporting of taxable income. Finally, certain investments generate
income that is fully exempt from taxation. To be sure, Congress deliberately created some of these exclusions from the tax base to stimulate
investment generally or to support specific types of investments
thought to be in the best economic or social interests of the nation.
Nevertheless, borrowing in connection with such investments exaggerates tax incentives in ways that Congress may not have intended.
Simply viewed then, the trouble with interest can be traced to
persistent gaps or preferences in the tax base. Such gaps are enlarged
when taxpayers borrow in connection with investments the income
from which is tax-preferred. Given this view, one remedial response
to the trouble with interest would be to eliminate those Code sections
providing tax deferral opportunities or outright exemptions. The polit-

ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 166, 167 (1913) (current version at I.R.C. § 163 (1986)). Since 1913, the
number of Code provisions dealing with interest has expanded dramatically. For a detailed
discussion of the evolution of the federal income tax treatment of interest deductibility, see
Berger, Simple Interest and Complex Taxes, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1981).
2. The term "tax-preferred investments" is frequently used in the tax literature but often
only vaguely defined. For purposes of this article, the term 'tax-preferred" will refer to any
investment, the income from which is 1) tax-exempt; 2) taxed at lower rates (for example, a
preferential rate on capital gains); or 3) accrued in an economic sense but tax-deferred (including
unrealized appreciation).
3. See Cooper, The Taming of the Shrewd: Identifying and ControllingIncome Tax Avoidance, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 657 (1985); Halperin, Capital Gains and Ordinary Deductions:
Negative Income Taxes for the Wealthy, 12 B.C. INDus. & CoM. L. REV. 387 (1971); Johnson,
Tax Shelter Gain: The Mismatch of Debt and Supply Side Depreciation,61 TEX. L. REV. 1013
(1983); Klein, Borrowing to Finance Tax FavoredInvestments, 1962 Wis. L. REV. 608; Warren,
Accelerated Capital Recovery, Debt, and Tax Arbitrage, 38 TAx LAW. 549 (1985).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1988

3

Florida Law
Iss. 4 [1988], Art. 3
UNIVERSITY
OFReview,
FLORIDAVol.
LAW40,
REVIEW

[Vol. 40

ical difficulties with this approach are immediately obvious. Moreover,
under limited circumstances it may be sensible tax policy to encourage
certain types of investments through the use of accelerated deductions
or exemptions.
Instead of closing gaps in the tax base, Congress responded to the
trouble with interest by limiting deductibility of interest expense in
an increasing number of specified circumstances. Most recently, the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 substantially revised many provisions in the
Internal Revenue Code that are directly or indirectly related to tax
treatment of borrowing and interest. The interest related provisions
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 fall into two distinct, but overlapping
categories. First, the Act expanded interest deduction limitations
when the taxpayer invests in tax-preferred assets. Second, the Act
expanded the Code's response to another form of leveraging available
even when taxpayers invest in non-tax-preferred assets. When interest
expense is deducted in advance of including income generated by borrowed funds, tax benefits flow not from the lower effective rate of
taxation on the investment, but simply from the timing of interest
deductions. The uniform capitalization rules of new section 263A now
require capitalization of expenses over the life of related assets in an
4
increasing number of cases.
While recent reform efforts are quite laudable, the new statutory
provisions and regulations concerning the treatment of interest are,
and will continue to be, tremendously complex and scattered throughout the Code. Unfortunately, complexity is inevitable in a world where
some interest is deductible and some is not. In such a world, perhaps
the greatest complexity is encountered in allocating interest expense
to various deductible and nondeductible categories. Moreover, the potentially overlapping jurisdiction of the numerous interest provisions
must be resolved. A uniform rule for the treatment of interest would
greatly improve and perhaps simplify the Internal Revenue Code.
Part II of this article attempts to broadly identify and classify
fundamental problems that have led to the awesome complexity of
current interest provisions. Part III will explore in detail and critique
new interest provisions added by the Tax Reform Act, focusing particularly on procedures adopted in recent regulations for allocation of
interest expense. Finally, the article will show that modern develop-

4. I.R.C. § 263A was not the first Congressional response to proper timing of interest
deductions. In fact, this provision replaced old I.R.C. § 189 (1976). See also infra notes 150-59
and accompanying text. Except as otherwise noted, all citations are to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended through October, 1988.
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ments have been moving the tax treatment of borrowing toward a
consumption tax model. This movement ironically comes at a time
when the tax treatment of investment transactions is moving closer
to an income tax ideal. These seemingly contrary trends are actually
moving the tax system closer to a more ideal hybrid tax that falls
somewhere between a consumption and an income tax. The final section offers some suggestions for revision of interest limitations.
Many scholars previously have considered many of the issues addressed in this article.r Nevertheless, recent changes made by the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 call for a fresh perspective given the new

categories of interest limitations and the complex allocation rules
necessary to implement both new and old interest limitations. A uni-

form approach to the tax treatment of borrowing is sorely needed.
II.

THE TROUBLE WITH INTEREST
6

A. Problems Related to the Proper Definition of Income
1.

Tax Treatment of Interest Under the Haig-Simons Ideal

Many commentators looking at the federal income tax in recent
years have identified the Haig-Simons accretion model as the ideal

5. See C. STEUERLE, TAXES, LOANS AND INFLATION (1985); Auerbach, Should Interest
Deductions be Limited?, in UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMPTION TAX (H. Aaron, H. Galper, J. Pechman, eds. 1988); Berger, supra note 1; Hickman,
Interest, Depreciation and Indexing, 5 VA. TAX REV. 773 (1986); Johnson, Is the Interest
Deduction Inevitable, 6 VA. TAX REV. 123 (1986); Klein, supra note 3; Koppelman, Tax Arbitrage and the Interest Deduction, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1988); McIntyre, An Inquiry Into
the Special Status of Interest Payments, 1981 DUKE L.J. 765; Shakow, Confrontingthe Problem
of Tax Arbitrage, 43 TAX L. REV. 1 (1987); Warren, supra note 3; see also Waren, The
Corporate Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83 YALE L.J. 1585 (1974) (discussion of
the interest deduction in the corporate setting).
6. One set of definitional problems that will not be addressed in this article concerns the
distinction between principal and interest. Because interest income is generally taxable while
the repayment of principal is not, lenders may be motivated to understate interest. This problem
has given rise to numerous time value of money rules. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 483 (interest on certain
deferred payments); id. §§ 1271-1275 (original issue discount rules); id. § 7872 (below market
interest loans). For a recent comprehensive analysis of time value of money issues, see Lokken,
The Time Value of Money Rules, 42 TAx L. REV. 1 (1986). For an excellent theoretical analysis
of the problems, see Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money," 95
YALE L.J. 506 (1986).
In addition, this article will not address inflation-related interest problems. Because any
given interest rate includes a component reflecting anticipated inflation, interest income and
expense are overstated during inflationary periods. Economists' arguments notwithstanding,
I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) implicitly includes all components of interest as gross income. Similarly, when
interest is deductible under I.R.C. § 163, all components of interest are included within the
deduction. The Treasury Department recently proposed indexing interest for inflation. This
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tax base to which an equitable income tax system should aspire. This
model definition provides that income is the algebraic sum of "(1) the

market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change
in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning
and end of the period in question. '' 7 Interest receipts represent growth
in the value of property rights and are thus includable as part of the
second component of the Simons definition.,
Despite general adherence to the view that interest receipts should
be included in gross income, 9 Congress has specifically exempted certain types of interest income from federal income taxation. 1 Moreover,

many entities are wholly tax-exempt and thus do not pay taxes on
interest received. As a result of these exceptions, a substantial amount
of interest paid is not taxed as income to recipients.11
As for interest payments, it is important to remember that even
under the Haig-Simons model, taxes are intended to be based on net

proposal, however, was not incorporated into the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 1 OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY, DEIt OF TREAS., TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC

GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 111-16 (1984). More

important, perhaps, inflation may exacerbate the troubles with interest:
The problems associated with interest deductibility in the current income tax are
themselves enhanced by the fact that deductible interest expense is defined to
include the inflation component of nominal interest under the current tax system;
this means that the magnitude of the interest deduction may be tripled or quadrupled by the impact of recently-experienced rates of inflation. The size of the
inflation induced expansion of the interest deduction substantially worsens the
interest deductibility problem.
Bossons, Indexingfor Inflation andthe InterestDeduction, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 945, 945 (1984).
For a discussion of the relationship of inflation to the nominal interest rate and the effect
of taxation on that relationship, see Ben-Zion, Recent Literature on the Impact of Taxation
and Inflation on Interest Rates, in TAXATION, INFLATION AND INTEREST RATES (V. Tanzi
ed. 1984).
7. H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).
8. But see Strnad, Taxation of Income from Capital:A TheoreticalReappraisal,37 STAN.
L. REV. 1023 (1985). For a discussion of the Strnad approach to income and critical responses
to it, see infra text accompanying notes 20-30.
9. I.R.C. § 61(a)(4).
10. See id. §§ 103, 141-147 (exemption for state and local bond and certain private activity
bond interest). In addition, interest on certain loans used to acquire employer securities will
be excluded from tax treatment pursuant to I.R.C. § 133, which excludes from gross income
50% of the interest received by certain banks, insurance companies, corporations engaged in
lending, and regulated investment companies when such interest is received with respect to a
securities acquisition loan.
11. For example, Eugene Steuerle estimated that for the taxable year 1981, of $491.1 billion
in interest payments made to domestic recipients, $220.1 billion were received in one non-taxed
form or another. C. STEUERLE, supra note 5, at 998.
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income as opposed to gross receipts. Thus, costs of earning income
must be subtracted to arrive at a proper measure of income. When a
taxpayer "earns" income not subject to tax as a result of a specific
tax preference, it is inappropriate to allow deduction of costs incurred
in generating that untaxed income. Moreover, cost deductions ideally
should be taken for the tax period in which the income is earned.13
This notion led to the introduction of many Code provisions that appropriately either disallow interest deductions entirely when related
income is wholly tax-exempt 14 or require proper matching of interest
expense with interest income when income is deferred. 15
At this juncture, one might ask why interest requires special rules.
Is not interest a cost like any other? If so, why are the general rules
applicable to cost deductions insufficient? The argument that costs
should be deducted in the same tax period in which related income is
16
included certainly applies to all costs, including interest.
Interest requires special tax treatment for several reasons. The
primary reason is the general fungibility of money. Taxpayers may
incur interest expense to carry many different investments or assets.
Some of the investments or assets may generate current income,
others deferred income, and still others fully exempt income. The
unique problem with interest is identifying the particular expenditure
to which interest should be attributed. Only after the expenditure is
identified can the proper treatment of the expense be determined.
Another problem with interest is that it may be the only major
expense incurred in connection with appreciating investments. Interest
paid on an ongoing and regular basis might appear as an "ordinary

12. This view is not universally accepted. For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 41-45.
13. This should be true whether one uses an accrual or cash method accounting. While at

first blush, an accrual method of accounting might appear to provide better matching of income
and expense, this is not necessarily so. Under the accrual method, income is included for 'the
taxable year when all the events have occurred which fix the right to receive such income'
while deductions are allowable for 'the taxable year in which all events have occurred which
establish the fact of... liability." Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) (1987) (emphasis added). The

events fixing any particular liability or cost in connection with the production of income will
not necessarily occur in the same year that the right to receive the related income is fixed.
14.

See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 163(h), 264, 265. For further discussion regarding these provisions,

see infra text accompanying notes 108-32.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 133-59.
16. In fact, this is the basis for the uniform capitalization rules of I.R.C. § 263A, which
require capitalization of direct and indirect costs generally. See infra text accompanying notes
150-59.
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and necessary" expense for the production of income. 17 Special rules
are necessary to ensure that taxpayers do not deduct such costs before
the activity has actually produced such income. 18
2. Is Interest a "Cost" Necessarily Deductible in Arriving at Net Income?
As noted, interest expense incurred in connection with a trade or
business is generally viewed as a "cost" of doing business that should
be deducted to properly measure net income. If one examines loan
transactions from an economic perspective, however, this may not be
true. First, one must separate the loan transaction from the expenditure requiring the borrowed funds. Surely, borrowed principal used
to meet ordinary and necessary business expenses should be deductible. 19 The question is whether or not a separate interest deduction
should be allowed as well and, if so, when to allow that deduction.
From an economic perspective, the present value of the obligation
to repay principal and interest should equal the total amount of the
original loan. Assuming that a market rate of interest is paid and the
same rate is used for discounting purposes, the borrower simply repays, in present value terms, the precise dollar equivalent of the
borrowed amount. The lender receives, in future value terms, the
precise equivalent of the original loan amount. This observation is a
variation of the theme that the market value of an asset is the discounted present value of the asset's projected future stream of earnings. 20 A loan is a financial asset, the price of which should be the
present value of the future stream of payments.
For example, assume that a taxpayer borrows $1000 payable in
ten years bearing 8 percent interest. To simplify, assume that the
taxpayer need not repay any principal until the end of year ten but
must pay $80 of interest each year. Using an 8 percent discount rate,
the present value of the taxpayer's obligation to repay $1000 in ten
years is approximately $463. The present value of the obligation to
pay $80 interest each year for the next ten years is approximately
$537. Thus, the overall present value of the taxpayer's obligation to

17.

I.R.C. § 212.

18. See, e.g., id. § 163(d). For further discussion of this provision, see infratext accompanying notes, 54, 133-35 & 147-49.
19. In a less than ideal tax world, however, deductions of even such principal amounts
might be denied as a correction for an inaccurate treatment elsewhere in the system.
20. For a good explanation of present value or stream of earnings analysis, see R. BREALY
& S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 11-24 (3d ed. 1988).
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repay principal and interest is precisely equal to the dollar amount of
the loan.21
Based on this present value analysis undertaken in an economic
world without taxes, one might be tempted to conclude that the borrower incurred no "cost" and the lender received no income. If so,
perhaps borrowers should not be entitled to interest deductions and
lenders should not report interest income. This is counter-intultive.
Can it be that lenders receive no interest income? If so, why would
financial institutions engage in lending activity? Moreover, one may
view interest as rent charged for the use of money much in the same
way that rent is charged for the use of other property. If the above
analysis holds, rental income would not be taxable to the lessor and
business-related rental expense would not be deductible to the lessee.
Can it be that rent charged for the use of money is a not a cost to
the borrower or income to the lender whereas rent charged for the
use of real estate is a cost to the tenant and income to the landlord?
Viewing the above example = in a world with income taxes, the
borrower still has received $1,000 that must be repaid at the end of
year ten. At an 8 percent rate, the borrower must set aside $463 to
repay the principal in ten years.23 The $537 return on this $463 investment will be subject to income tax. Given that the present value of
the interest repayment obligation is also $537, the income earned and
the interest expense represent a "wash." Only by allowing a deduction
for interest expense can the taxpayer achieve a tax wash matching
the economic wash.
In a recent article claiming to be a theoretical reappraisal of the
tax treatment of borrowing and investment, 24 Professor Strnad succumbs to the temptation of the purely economic perspective concluding,
in essence, that even in an income tax world, investments should not
be taxed and interest on borrowing not deducted. Using over fifty

a loan bears a market
21. In a recent article, Professor Coven made the point that "[i]f
rate of interest, the amount borrowed will equal the present value of the obligation to repay
the principal with interest." Coven, Limiting Losses Attributableto Nonrecourse Debt: A Defense

of the TraditionalSystem Against the At-Risk Concept, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 41, 63 (1985). The
example used in the text is a variation of the example used by Professor Coven to illustrate
his point. Working with a $100 loan repayable in year 10 with 8% interest payable in the interim,
he concludes that the present values of the principal and interest obligations are approximately
$45 and $55, respectively. Professor Coven's present value computations similarly are taken
before taking the interest deduction into account.
22. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
23. This figure assumes an 8% rate of return on investment and simply is the present value
of the repayment obligation.
24. Strnad, supra note 8.
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equations, Professor Strnad argues that traditional treatment of investment and borrowing transactions has no analytic basis, and that
a cash-flow tax would more closely approximate the Haig-Simons ideal
than the current income tax.2 Under a typical cash-flow or consumption based system, the tax base includes only consumption and allows
immediate deduction of all expenditures for savings and investment.
If the value of an asset is equal to the present value of its future
stream of earnings, and the cost of the asset is equal to such present
value, then current deductibility of the cost of the asset is equivalent
to exempting the future income stream from taxation. This immediate
deduction-yield exemption equivalence, most often associated with discussion of a consumption tax, is an outgrowth of present value
analysis.2 6 Applied to borrowing transactions, a cash-flow tax would
include borrowed funds in income and permit deduction of principal
and interest when repaid. As an economic equivalent, the immediate
deduction-yield exemption equivalence principle suggests that the interest deduction simply could be disallowed.Y
By defining income through the use of economic net present values,
Professor Strnad ensures his conclusion that a cash-flow tax is closer
to the Haig-Simons ideal than an income tax. In response, Professors
Kaplow and Warren correctly point out that Professor Strnad's claim
is merely a tautology. 2s Professors Kaplow and Warren further conclude:
[T]raditional analysis of the Haig-Simons concept is not inconsistent with the use of present value concepts to determine net wealth, Professor Strnad's assertion to the contrary
notwithstanding. An individual's wealth, at any given point
in time, depends on the present value of his future cash
flows, but that indisputablefact does not by itselfprove that
cash flow is the preferable tax base. Advocates of the Haig-

25. Id. at 1025.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 216-25.
27. Id.
28. Kaplow & Warren, An Income Tax by Any Other Name: A Reply to ProfessorStrnad,
38 STAN. L. REV. 399, 400 (1986) [hereinafter Kaplow & Warren, Reply to Strnad]. The debate
between Professor Strnad and Professors Kaplow and Warren is continued in Strnad, The
Bankruptcy of Conventional Tax Timing Wisdom is Deeper Than Semantics: A Rejoinder to
Professors Kaplow and Warren, 39 STAN. L. REv. 389 (1987); Kaplow & Warren, Professor
Strnad's Rejoinder: Simply Semantics, 39 STAN. L. REV. 419 (1987). See also Popkin, Tax
Ideals in the Real World: A Comment on Professor Strnad's Approach to Tax Fairness, 62

IND. L.J. 63 (1986) (refuting Strnad's standard for tax fairness and interpretation of the Haig-Simons ideal).
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Simons concept can consistently understand that wealth at
any moment is the present discounted value of future flows
and also argue that the preferable tax base measures the differences in wealth ex post between two such points in time.2
Stated another way, our current system taxes income, not wealth.
The winners in the heated exchange concerning investment and borrowing transactions are clearly Professors Kaplow and Warren.
Nevertheless, Professor Strnad's analysis still may prove useful.
In focusing on the trouble with interest, one must understand what
interest is and is not from an economic perspective. Although the
economic net present value approach to investment and borrowing
transactions advocated by Professor Strnad reflects a consumption tax
world, the denial of interest deductions under certain circumstances
makes sense in an income tax world.
Returning to the above example, an interest deduction is appropriate to provide a tax wash when income from the funds set aside to
repay is subject to tax. When the return on investment is not subject
to tax, the interest deduction is no longer necessary. In fact, an interest deduction in such cases provides an unwarranted advantage to
the borrower. As illustrated below, much of the trouble with interest
stems from the consumption-like treatment given certain investments
under current law. In other words, some investments receive a fully
or partially tax-free yield. Unless borrowing related to such investments is treated in a similar consumption-like fashion, troubling dissymmetries result. °
B.

Gaps in the Tax Base Contributingto the Trouble With Interest
1. Intra-Taxpayer Gaps
a. Tax-Exempt Interest Recipients

Ordinarily, any interest payment reflected as a liability of the debtor should appear as an interest receipt or asset of the creditor.3 1 Thus,
interest deducted by the payor for tax purposes should be included
in the taxable income of the recipient. To the contrary, recent data
suggests that substantial amounts of interest deducted by United

29. Kaplow & Warren, Reply to Strnad, supra note 28, at 409 (citations omitted and
emphasis added).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 46-101.
31. This point has been forcefully made in Tax Arbitrage, Inflation, and the Taxation of
Interest Payments and Receipts, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 991, 994 (1984).
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States taxpayers is received by entities not subject to taxation. These
entities are either tax-exempt under the Code or foreign entities not
subject to taxation in the United States. 2 The federal government is
thus "whipsawed"; interest income is often untaxed to the recipient,
while interest costs are deductible by the debtor. Such concerns recently led the Senate Finance Committee to propose an amendment
to section 163 that would have limited deductibility of interest paid
or accrued to a related tax-exempt entity. The Conference Committee
considering the Tax Reform Act of 1986 later dropped the amendment . 3
These macro concerns with the overall integrity of the tax system
do not necessarily justify general limitations on interest deductions
taken by individual payors. They do reflect, however, an absense of
overall symmetry in the taxation of lenders and borrowers. Symmetry
could be achieved in one of two possible ways. The first method would
be to eliminate all tax-free receipts of interest. At the other extreme,
denial of interest deductions might be supported as a proxy for taxing
tax-exempt recipients on interest payments received. These solutions
are both impractical and unlikely. The compromise is to take a closer
look at the underlying deductibility of interest. Given the gaps on the
recipient side of the equation, the tax system at least must be careful
to disallow debtor side deductions inappropriate to the proper measurement of the debtor's income.34
b. Borrowing Between Related Taxpayers
Another concern affecting overall integrity of the tax system's
treatment of borrowing transactions is the use of borrowing between
32. See supra note 11.
33. Proposed § 984 of H.R. 3838, as passed by the Senate on June 24, 1986, would have
added a new subsection to § 163 entitled "Limitation On Deductibility Of Interest Paid To
Related Tax-exempt Entity." While this provision would have applied only to related tax-exempt
entities, it nevertheless expresses general Congressional concern with erosion of the tax base
through unwarranted interest deductions. S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 424 (1986).
34. The statement in the text should not be taken to suggest that symmetrical treatment of
opposite sides of a transaction should always be required. Concern for equity should override
concern for symmetry. For example, interest paid by an accrual basis taxpayer may be received
by a cash basis taxpayer. As a result, interest expense may be deducted by the borrower before
it is included in the recipients income. Unless the parties are related, there is little to be done
about such dissymmetry that is the necessary result of allowing taxpayers to choose different
methods of accounting. In any event, an accrual basis taxpayer cannot take all interest deductions
at the outset. Under I.R.C. § 461(h), which limits accrual basis taxpayers, the all events test
normally applicable to such taxpayers is not met until "economic performance" occurs. I.R.C.
§ 461(h). With respect to interest, economic performance occurs as time passes and the lender
foregoes use of the funds. H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 875 (1984).
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related parties. Prior to legislation correcting this problem, such borrowing was particularly troubling when the lender was a cash basis
taxpayer and the borrower was an accrual basis taxpayer. The borrower could take immediate deductions for interest expense even
though the lender did not include the interest income until actual
payment was made. Although this is true for any loan transaction
when the lender uses cash basis and the borrower uses accrual basis
accounting, transactions between related parties offer greater potential for abuse. Congress responded to the related party borrowing
problem by adding section 267. This section defers the payor's interest
deduction until the payee includes the payment in gross income.
2.

Individual Taxpayer Measurement Flaws: The Problem of Rate Arbitrage
a.

In General

Many commentators have written in recent years about the problem
of tax arbitrage.3 While the term 'tax arbitrage" is rather new, the
concept is an old one. Simply put, one engages in tax arbitrage by
investing in assets that provide current deductions but do not generate
current income, or that will generate tax-exempt or otherwise tax-preferred income.7 Taxpayers engaging in tax arbitrage seek to take
advantage of deferral as well as lower tax rates applicable to certain
preferred transactions. Eugene Steuerle perhaps stated it best when
he described tax arbitrage as "activity that is influenced by the different tax treatment of the returns ... on various assets [or debts]."'
He went on to describe the most common form of arbitrage as "borrowing and making deductible interest payments while purchasing
assets whose returns are tax-preferred - that is, taxed at a comparatively lower rate than interest-bearing assets." 39 For purposes of this

35. I.R.C. § 267(a)(2).
36. See C. STEUERLE, supra note 5; Johnson, supranote 3; Shakow, supranote 5; Warren,
supra.note 3. For earlier treatments written before the term 'tax arbitrage" was in vogue, see
Halperin, supra note 3; Klein, supra note 3.
37. Tax arbitrage should be distinguished from financial arbitrage. In the borrowing context,
an investor engages in financial arbitrage simply by borrowing at a rate lower than the rate of
return on investment. Absent special tax provisions, it would not be economically sensible for
an investor to borrow at or above the rate of return on investment. When tax preferences are
added to the picture, the investor engaged in tax arbitrage may well benefit from borrowing
and investing at the same rate. For a discussion of the distinctions between financial and tax
arbitrage, see C. STEUERLE, supra note 5, at 57-92.
38. Id at 57.
39. Id.
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article, the term "rate arbitrage" refers to leveraging through borrowing to invest in assets, the return on which is tax-preferred.
To engage in rate arbitrage the taxpayer simply takes advantage
of tax preferences existing in the Code and magnifies the advantage
by using borrowed funds. Through the use of nonrecourse debt, an
investor can acquire an interest in a tax shelter without using personal
funds and without bearing ultimate liability for the decline in value
of the property. Nevertheless, prior to adoption of the section 465
at-risk and section 469 passive loss rules,4 ° the investor was entitled
to his or her full share of accelerated depreciation, interest, and other
relevant deductions. The adjusted basis used for purposes of computing
depreciation deductions included the full amount of the nonrecourse
borrowing. Deductions for depreciation and interest therefore generated paper losses, which in turn were used to offset income from other
sources.
b.

Conflicting Views

In recent years, Congress has responded to arbitrage opportunities
made available through various tax preferences by restricting interest
deductions. 41 The propriety of this Congressional response is not universally accepted. Some writers argue that the real culprit is the
horizontal inequity created by excluding certain income from the tax
42
base or allowing certain income to be taxed at lower effective rates.
To be sure, the ideal response, given an income as opposed to a
consumption tax world, would be to eliminate the underlying tax preference. That being unlikely, the next best alternative may be to limit
leveraging opportunities for investment in assets generating tax-free
income.
Some of those opposed to interest limitationse argue that to deny
interest deductions to borrowers who take advantage of tax preferences discriminates against them in favor of cash investors who acquire

40. See infra text accompanying notes 138-149.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 108-149.
42. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 3, at 614-15; Oliver, Section 265(2): A Counterproductive
Solution to a Nonexistent Problem, 40 TAx L. REV. 351 (1985); White, Proper Income Tax
Treatment of Deductionsfor Personal Expense, in STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM: COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS

ON BROADENING THE TAx BASE 365 (Comm. Print 1959). See also Shakow, supra note 5
(Shakow takes the position that the tax arbitrage problem is exaggerated and that complex
anti-arbitrage Code provisions should be eliminated).
43. See supra note 42.
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similar assets. A cash investor who invests in an identical tax-preference item is not limited in his use of the tax benefit; why punish the
borrower?
The argument here is similar to one often heard in connection with
the debate on the home mortgage interest deduction. The present
system permits homeowners to deduct mortgage interest but does not
allow similar deductions to renters, thereby discriminating against renters. Repeal of the interest deduction, however, creates a new advantage to those who purchase their homes with cash and thereby creates
a new form of discrimination against borrowers. This charge is often
answered with an empirical response. The percentage of homeowners
who acquire their homes with cash is quite small. Under a cost-benefit
analysis, the benefit of eliminating discrimination against a greater
number of renters outweighs the cost of providing a benefit to a small
number of cash home buyers.
Similarly, the number of cash investors who currently hold an
advantage over borrowers by virtue of sections 163(d), 264, and 265
is probably quite small. Moreover, the liquidation of appreciated assets
that may be necessary to generate funds for the cash investor could
generate tax liability and offset any advantage to cash investors. The
advantage to cash investors under current law, if indeed there is an
advantage, is limited. Finally and most importantly, absent special
statutory limitations, the debtor who acquires tax-preferred assets
may use interest and other deductions to offset salary and other income. Such results are unavailable to the cash investor. "4
Another argument sometimes raised against interest deduction
limitations is based on the implicit tax on tax-preferred investments.
Taxable investments must provide a higher rate of return than tax-preferred investments in order to compete in the marketplace. The taxpayer who invests in a tax-preferred investment pays an implicit tax
through a lower rate of return. If this implicit tax causes the investor
to bear a tax burden equal to that of the investor in a comparable
taxable investment, no restriction on interest should be necessary.
The difficulty with this approach is determining the extent of the
implicit tax. If the implicit tax is sufficient to fully offset any tax

44.

For further critique of the debt versus cash investor arguments against interest limita-

tions and a general discussion of the diverging views on interest deduction, see Johnson, supra
note 5, at 144-70. In particular, Professor Johnson addresses the notion that borrowers should

be entitled to deduct interest because taxpayers who liquidate assets and switch to tax-preferred
assets can take advantage of preferences without restrictions. Professor Johnson argues that
allowing all taxpayers to catch up with the liquidators goes too far. Id. at 148-51.
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preference, why would investors purchase tax-preferred investments?
If the implicit tax only partially offsets any tax preference, only a
partial interest expense restriction is warranted. Although this argument is theoretically sound, difficulties in determining the extent of
such implicit tax on particular assets make practical application of a
45
partial interest disallowance nearly impossible.
This article takes the position that interest deduction limitations
are not only appropriate, but should be extended. Nevertheless, the
primary thrust of the article is not to rehash the arguments for and
against interest deduction restrictions. Rather, it attempts to provide
a historical perspective on the current status of interest deductions
and to focus on the problems of a system that allows some interest
deductions and not others. The remainder of this section provides an
outline and summary of the tax preferences that fueled the growth
of rate arbitrage, thus also fueling the expansion of interest deduction
limitations.
c. Investments Yielding Tax-Exempt Income
i) Statutorily Exempt Income
Investments in assets generating tax-exempt income illustrate the
rate arbitrage problem in its purest form. If interest on borrowing to
invest in such assets is deductible while income generated by the
investment assets is never taxed, tax benefits accrue to the borrower.
When borrowed funds produce tax-exempt income, the interest deduc46
tion should be completely disallowed.
ii) Imputed Income
The purchase of a principal residence or other consumer durable
with borrowed funds serves as another classic example of a tax shelter
generated by investing in an asset yielding tax-free income. Homeowners are not required to include the imputed income from home ownership in their taxable income. At the same time, they may fully deduct
47
their mortgage interest expense.

45. In his recent article on tax arbitrage, however, Professor Shakow takes a stab at a
formula to take the implicit tax into account in deriving a partial interest disallowance. See
Shakow, supra note 5, at 13 n.44.
46. For a discussion of statutory provisions responding to this form of arbitrage, see infra
text accompanying notes 108-32.
47. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, which eliminated the interest deduction for purchases of
most consumer durables, left the home mortgage interest deduction virtually untouched. See
infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
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Under an ideal accretion model tax, the imputed income from home
ownership and other consumer durables would be included and the
costs of earning such income subtracted in measuring net income. In
contrast to such an ideal, our current tax system does not include
imputed income in the tax base. This departure from the ideal accretion
tax base is compounded when taxpayers are permitted to deduct interest expense incurred in connection with such acquisitions.4
To exempt an investment yield from taxation is roughly equivalent
to permitting a full deduction for the investment at the outset.49 This
treatment is more consistent with a consumption tax than an income
tax. Thus, both the statutory exemption of certain yields as well as
the exclusion of imputed income from the tax base represent hybrid
consumption tax elements in an otherwise income tax world.
d. Failure to Tax Unrealized Appreciation
i) In General
Under the ideal income tax based on the Haig-Simons definition of
income,5° all changes in property value would be included in the tax
base. Thus, even the unrealized appreciation (or depreciation) in the
value of assets for each accounting period would be subject to taxation.
Nevertheless, nonrecognition of this unrealized appreciation has long
been a fundamental principle driving our income tax system. 51 Under
current law, gains and losses are generally not taxed until they are
realized. 52 The failure to tax unrealized appreciation violates principles
of horizontal equity; taxpayers who have invested in assets that do

48. For further discussion of current provisions restricting personal interest deductions,
see infra text accompanying notes 129-32.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 216-25 and supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
50. See supra text accompanying note 7.
51. In Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), the Supreme Court viewed the principle
as so fundamental that it held a tax on the unrealized appreciation reflected in a stock dividend
to be unconstitutional. Most commentators believe the Court's decision on the constitutional
issue was incorrectly decided. See, e.g., H. SIMONS supra note 7, at 183-84, 197-204; Stone,
Back to Fundamentals:Another Version of the Stock Dividend Saga, 79 COLuM. L. REV. 898,
916-19 (1979); Surrey, The Supreme Court and the Federal Income Tax: Some Implications of
the Recent Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REV. 779, 791 (1941).
52. A notable exception is the allowance of depreciation deductions on wasting assets. The
loss in value due to such waste is arguably unrealized until sale or abandonment of the asset.
Nevertheless, our tax system permits depreciation deductions. I.R.C. §§ 167, 168. On the other
hand, if realization requires merely an identifiable event as opposed to a closed and completed
transaction, one might argue that the actual physical exhaustion of an asset is a form of realized
depreciation.
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not generate current income benefit over those who rely on salary or
interest-bearing assets. Although the taxation of unrealized appreciation would be ideal from a horizontal equity perspective, proposals to
include unrealized gains in the tax base have been rejected because
the yearly valuation of assets would be administratively too burdensome. Alternatively, the imposition of such a tax would burden taxpayers who might be required to liquidate their assets in order to pay
the tax. 3 Because taxation of gain on appreciating assets is deferred,
the yield in connection with such assets is partially exempt from tax.
Unless a retroactive charge for the time value of the deferral is imposed, the taxpayer pays a lower tax on the gain than he or she would
pay under a system that accrued unrealized gains annually. This exclusion from the tax base contributes to the hybrid nature of our tax
system, which rests somewhere between a consumption and an income
tax.
The gap in the tax base reflecting unrealized appreciation is compounded when the taxpayer can take current deductions for borrowing
to acquire appreciating assets while the appreciation is not subject to
tax until resale. Among the earliest Congressional efforts to respond
to this flaw in the tax base is section 163(d), which restricts an individual taxpayer's investment interest deduction to his or her net investment income for the taxable year. 4
ii) "Borrowing Out" Against Appreciated Property
a.) Individual Taxpayers
The tax system's failure to include unrealized appreciation in the
tax base is compounded when the taxpayer deducts interest on borrowing while using appreciated property as collateral for the loan. Borrowing against appreciated property gives taxpayers access to funds while
still allowing them to benefit from deferral of the appreciation gain.
In at least one case, a court was confronted with the argument
that nonrecourse borrowing in excess of basis in the mortgaged property resulted in immediate recognition of gain. The taxpayer made

53. But see Shakow, Taxation Without Realization, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1986) (Shakow
argues for a tax on unrealized gains and suggests that the administrative and hardship difficulties
can be overcome). See also Ginsburg, Levin, Canellos & Eustice, Reexamining Subchapter C:
An Overview and Some Modest Proposalsto Stimulate Debate, in CORPORATE TAX REFORM:
A REPORT OF THE INVITATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SUBCHAPTER Q, 39, 42-43 (G. Yin &
G. Mundstock eds. 1988) (authors propose a limited market-to-market regime for marketable
property).
54. See infra text accompanying notes 133-35.
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this argument in Woodsam Associates v. Commissioner5 hoping to
simultaneously receive a step-up in basis, and thus reduce gain on
later sale of the property. Because the taxpayer had not "disposed
of' her property by taking on additional indebtedness, the court concluded that "realization of gain was ... postponed for taxation until
there was a final disposition of the property. . . . Therefore, [the
taxpayer's] borrowing did not change the basis for the computation
of gain or loss." Despite the taxpayer's arguments in the Woodsam
case, the notion that borrowing against appreciated property creates
taxable gain has never been seriously considered by the courts. No
gain is recognized until the taxpayer sells or disposes of the mortgaged
property.
In the more egregious arbitrage cases, courts have denied the
interest deduction completely on the theory that the transaction was
a sham and that no "genuine indebtedness" was incurred. The landmark case in this area is Knetsch v. United States.57 In this case, the
taxpayer purchased ten 30-year deferred annuity savings bonds from
an insurance company. The taxpayer financed the purchase with a
small sum of cash and a substantial nonrecourse note to the same
insurance company secured by the annuities for the balance5 The
taxpayer prepaid and deducted the interest each year on the note. 9
Under the terms of his annuity agreement, Mr. Knetsch was also
entitled at the beginning of each year to borrow against the excess
year-end value of the annuity over the amount of his indebtedness.6
The interest on the second debt was also prepaid and deducted each
year. 61 Such borrowing against the appreciating value of the policy
reduced the amount of the monthly annuity that the taxpayer would
ultimately receive at maturity to approximately $43 per month.c The
court held the transaction a sham and denied the taxpayer's interest
deductions. 63
55. 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952). It should be noted that in Woodsam, the shareholder who
contributed property to the corporate taxpayer had been personally liable for several mortgages
on the property in question. Id. at 358-59. Through use of a "dummy" corporation, the shareholder
was able to borrow additional cash without personal liability. Id. The primary issue in the case
was whether or not this conversion from recourse to nonrecourse debt was a taxable event
resulting in a step-up in basis. Id.
56. Id. at 359.
57. 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
58. Id. at 362.
59. Id. at 363.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 364.
63. Id. at 366.
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Rolled into one, the Knetsch case provides an example of traditional
tax arbitrage in the form of borrowing to support a deferred income
investment, a case of "borrowing out" against future appreciation and
a case of "sham indebtedness." 64 Later cases have expanded the sham
indebtedness doctrine denying interest deductions when the loan transaction was genuine but the overall transaction lacked "purpose, substance, or utility apart from... anticipated tax consequences." 65 This
expanded notion ultimately led to the line of "purposeful activity"
cases, which deny interest deductions taken by tax shelter participants
6
who have no expectation of profit other than through tax deductions.
The taxpayer in Knetsch might well have lost on this basis even if
the borrowing had been genuine.

64. Section 264 was amended after the Knetsch case to disallow deductions for "[a]ny amount
paid or accrued on indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase or carry a single premium
life insurance, endowment or annuity contract," I.R.C. § 264(a)(2), and with certain exceptions,
"any amount paid or accrued on indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase or carry a life
insurance, endowment, or annuity contract ... pursuant to a plan of purchase which contemplates
the systematic direct or indirect borrowing of part or all of the increases in cash value of such
contract.. . ." Id. § 264(a)(3).
65. Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734, 740 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1005 (1967).
66. See, e.g., Rothschild v. United States, 407 F.2d 404 (Ct. Cl. 1969). More recently these
"sham" cases have taken a different turn. In Frank Lyon Co. V. United States, 435 U.S. 561
(1978), the Supreme Court held that when
there is a genuine multiple-party transaction with economic substance which is
compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory realities, is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features that
have meaningless labels attached, the Government should honor the allocation of
rights and duties effectuated by the parties.
Id. at 583-84. The Fourth Circuit applied the Frank Lyon test in Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985), concluding that the taxpayer was not entitled to
depreciation or interest deductions attributable to nonrecourse borrowing in a sale-leaseback
arrangement but was entitled to take interest deductions attributable to recourse borrowing.
Despite finding that the sale-leaseback transaction was a sham, the court concluded that
[u]nder Frank Lyon, the court may not ignore transactions that have economic
substance even if the motive for the transaction is to avoid taxes ....
Moreover,
I.R.C. § 163 does not limit deductibility of installment interest expense depending
on the item purchased by the taxpayer. Therefore, although Rice did not for tax
purposes purchase property with the recourse note and may not base depreciation
deductions on it, the note nevertheless represents genuine debt on which Rice is
entitled to deduct interest expense.
Id. at 96. Another recent development involves the application of I.R.C. § 183, originally
intended to restrict deduction of "hobby losses" as a weapon to combat tax shelters. For an
analysis of the expanded scope of § 183, see Note, Attacking Tax Shelters: Section 183 Leaves
the Farm and Goes to the Movies, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 89 (1986).
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Although politically unlikely, elimination of the realization requirement altogether would eliminate much of the tax arbitrage problem
as well as other complexities.67 In the interim, however, a rule should
be adopted that provides for recognition of gain on borrowing against
unrealized appreciation. Although the taxpayer who uses such appreciated property as collateral has not disposed of the property, he
or she has certainly taken advantage of such appreciation by "cashing
out" funds for personal use.
b.) Corporate Taxpayers

In the corporate setting, the ability to borrow against appreciated
property without tax consequence raises peculiar issues. Falkoff v.
Commissioner presents a good example of such problems. 69 That case
involved a chain of business ownership whereby individual taxpayers
held an interest in a partnership, which in turn owned a controlling
interest in a corporation holding several subsidiaries.70 One of these
subsidiaries owned substantially appreciated real estate with anticipated realization of gain in the near future. 7' The parent corporation
had no earnings and profits prior to the subsidiary's sale of the property.T2 Before the signing of a contract for sale of the subsidiary's
property, the parent corporation borrowed approximately $18 million
from a bank and shortly thereafter distributed $7.5 million of those
funds to the partnership in satisfaction of an outstanding debt and
another $10 million as a regular corporate distribution. 73 Because the
distribution took place at a time when the distributing corporation
had no earnings and profits, the distribution was held to be a return
of capital rather than a dividend. 74 This result occurred despite the
fact that the borrowing, which enabled the corporation to make the
distribution, was indirectly based on the anticipated gains from the
sale of the subsidiary's real estate.

67. See supra text accompanying notes 50-66.
68. For a discussion of such a rule in the context of nonrecourse borrowing, see Curie,
Mortgagors Gain on Mortgaging Property ForMore Than Cost Without PersonalLiability, 6
TAx L. REv. 319 (1951); Del Cotto, Basis and Amount Realized Under Crane: A Current
View of Some Tax Effects in Mortgage Financing, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 69, 96-8 (1969).
69. 604 F.2d 1045 (7th Cir. 1979), rev'g 36 T.C.M. 417 (1977).
70. Id. at 1046.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1047.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1046-47, 1051; see I.R.C. §§ 301(c)(2), 316 (1954).
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The fundamental flaw here is, of course, that the tax system fails
to include unrealized appreciation in the tax base. That failure is
compounded, however, when taxpayers are able to borrow against
those assets without immediate tax consequence. The Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit found: 'this is a case where a corporation
without accrued or present earnings and profits borrowed against its
own appreciated assets and made a distribution in anticipation of future
profits. As the Tax Court itself recognized, such a distribution does
not result in taxable income to the current shareholder." 75
In a similar case, Commissionerv. Gross,76 the taxpayers were real
estate developers whose controlled corporations took out Federal Housing Administration insured mortgages in excess of cash needs.7 After
writing up the value of real estate on the books to reflect unrealized
appreciation, the corporations distributed the excess cash to the taxpayer-shareholders. 7s The court viewed the real source of the distributions as anticipated profits from unrealized appreciation. 79 Because such
appreciation is not included in earnings and profits, however, the portion of the distributions exceeding existing earnings and profits was
treated as capital gain to the extent that the excess distribution exceeded the taxpayers' stock basis.*
Because the current tax system fails to tax unrealized appreciation
or to include unrealized gains in earnings and profits, the corporations
in both Gross and Falkoff were able to make tax-free recovery of capital
and capital gain distributions to their shareholders as opposed to taxable dividends. At a minimum, the tax system should provide that any
borrowing against appreciated property will generate earnings and
profits for the corporation to the extent of the previously unrealized
appreciation. 81

75. 604 F.2d at 1050.
76. 236 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1956).
77. Id. at 613-14.
78. Id. at 614.
79. Id. at 616.
80. Id. at 615, 617. The court in Gross also cited the Woodsam case, see supra note 55
and accompanying text, for the proposition that "mortgaging of property for an amount in excess
of its basis does not result in a realization of income ...

."

Id. at 618.

81. I.R.C. § 312(i) currently provides such a result for loans to a corporation that are
"made, guaranteed, or insured by the United States (or by any agency or instrumentality
thereof)." When the amount of such loans exceeds the adjusted basis of the property constituting
security for such loans, "then the earnings and profits of the corporation shall be increased by
the amount of such excess, and (immediately after the distribution) shall be decreased by the
amount of such excess." I.R.C. § 312(i).
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e. Capital Gains
Compounding the absence of tax on unrealized appreciation, prior
to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 if the asset in which the taxpayer
invested was a capital asset, he or she received the added benefit of
lower capital gains rates on the deferred gain. Thus, leveraged investment in an appreciating capital asset was doubly blessed. In fact,
many viewed the lower tax rates on capital gains as among the primary
causes of the "negative income tax for the wealthy."s Congress recently eliminated these preferential rates, thus removing one of the
major underlying causes of tax shelters.Y Although elimination of these
special rates goes a long way, this provision alone was insufficient to
deal the final death blow to tax shelters.
f. Accelerated Deductions
In the typical tax shelter, the investor purchases depreciable property using substantial amounts of borrowed funds. Basis, for purposes
of computing depreciation, includes such borrowed amounts, whether
recourse or nonrecourse.1' In most cases, depreciation will be reported
under the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS).8 This depreciation method permits the taxpayer to take deductions for exhaustion,
wear, tear, and obsolescence of depreciable property in advance of
the property's true economic decline in value. Although recent amend-

An alternative solution in the corporate setting would be to simply repeal the §§ 301(c) &
316 earnings and profits limitation on dividends and instead provide for full taxation to shareholders of all ongoing corporate distributions. Professor Walter Blum made such a proposal in
Blum, The Earnings and Profits Limitation on Dividend Income: A Reappraisal, 53 TAxES
68 (1975). See also STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 98TH CONG., 1ST SEss., THE
REFORM AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS 77 (Comm.

Print 1983) (a similar proposal that was never adopted).
82. See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 3.
83. Congress was careful, however, to limit the tax on capital gains to a maximum of 28%.
I.R.C. § 1(j). Moreover, the conferees in their Report on the Tax Reform Act of 1986 stated
that the "current statutory structure for capital gains is retained in the Code to facilitate
reinstatement of a capital gains rate differential if there is a future tax rate increase." H.R.
CoNF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-106 (1986).

84. Basis for purposes of calculating depreciation on property subject to exhaustion, wear
and tear, and obsolescence is adjusted cost basis as determined under I.R.C. § 1011. I.R.C. §
167(g). It is now well settled that such basis includes borrowed amounts, whether recourse or
nonrecourse. See infra text accompanying notes 98-100.
85. ACRS was first enacted by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34,
§ 201(a), 95 Stat. 172 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 168 (1986)).
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ments to ACRS have decelerated the rate at which such depreciation
is allowed, acceleration beyond true economic waste is still permitted.w
Before Congress enacted various interest deduction limitations, taxpayers could simultaneously take a current deduction for all of the
interest expense on borrowing and take advantage of the accelerated
depreciation schedules available under ACRS. Moreover, prior to its
repeal in 1986, an investor in a tax shelter might have been eligible
for the Investment Tax Credit (ITC).Y
Numerous commentators have pointed out that the combination of
ACRS, ITC, and interest deductions permitted some investors to deduct more than what would have been allowed had the investor been
permitted to immediately expense investment in the asset, thus creating a "negative tax."' Such treatment provided taxpayers with deductions beyond those typically allowed even under a consumption or
cash-flow tax. Under a consumption tax, any amounts spent on savings
or investments are not considered part of the taxpayer's consumption,
and thus are immediately excluded from the tax base.8 In contrast

86. Some have argued that even straight-line allowances can be viewed as a form of accelerated depreciation and that a sinking-fund approach is the only proper measure of depreciation.
See, e.g., M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 139 (5th ed. 1988). The validity of
this observation is debated by Professors Blum and Kahn. See Blum, Accelerated Depreciation:
A ProperAllowance for Measuring Net Income?!!, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1172, 1179-84 (1980)
(discusses Professor Chirelstein's observation but concludes that straight-line depreciation is
easiest to justify); Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation- Tax Expenditure or ProperAllowance
for Measuring Net Income?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1, 33-37 (1980) (challenging Professor Chirelstein's approach).
87. I.R.C. § 46 (1985). With a few minor exceptions, the regular investment tax credit was
repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 211(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2166-68.
88. See Cooper, supra note 3, at 674-75; Halperin, supra note 3, at 387; Johnson, aupra
note 3, at 1013-20; Klein, supra note 3, at 608; Warren, supra note 3, at 553-55.
89. The definition most frequently used in the income versus consumption tax debate provides that income is the algebraic sum of "(1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption
and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and the
end of the period in question." H. SIMONS, supranote 7, at 50. This definition can be expressed
by the following mathematical formula: I = C + A W. Thus, a consumption tax differs from
an income tax in its elimination of "A W" as a current component of income. For some of the
literature on the consumption versus income tax debate, see N. KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE
TAX (1955); WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE? (J. Pechman ed. 1980);
Andrews, Fairnessand the PersonalIncome Tax: A Reply to ProfessorWarren, 88 HARv. L.
REV. 947 (1975); Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow PersonalIncome Tax, 87 HARv.
L. REV. 1113 (1974) [hereinafter Andrews, Consumption Tax]; Warren, Would a Consumption,
Tax Be FairerThan an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081 (1980) [hereinafter Warren, Consumption Tax]; Warren, Fairnessand a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow PersonalIncome Tax, 88
HARV. L. REV. 931 (1975).
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to the near consumption or cash-flow treatment of the investment
itself that Congress previously permitted through ACRS, ITC, and
other deductions, 9° the borrowing component of the transaction has
always been treated under a pure accretion tax model. That is,
amounts borrowed are not included in income when received, nor
deducted when repaid. Interest on borrowing is deductible as paid.
Another description of immediate expensing previously possible
through leveraged investments in tax-preferred property subject to
the ACRS allowance may make sheltering possibilities even more apparent. As noted earlier, 91 immediate expensing of property often is
viewed as the equivalent of exempting the yield of such property from
income tax.9- If true, return on the taxpayer's investment in ACRS
property discussed above was effectively exempt from tax.
One of the primary causes of tax sheltering has been the combination of a consumption tax treatment of investment with an income tax
treatment of borrowing.9 One solution to the shelter problem would
be to move to a method of depreciation that more accurately reflects
true economic decline in value of a wasting asset. 9 Congress began
moving in this direction as evidenced by its recent repeal of the ITC9
and the lengthening of ACRS recovery periods. Nevertheless, ACRS
as amended still permits depreciation deductions in excess of true
decline in value.9 At the same time, limitations on interest and other
deductions for passive investors will eliminate some of the arbitrage
available through investment in assets subject to accelerated depreciation. 97
90. Numerous additional provisions permit accelerated deduction of certain expenses. See,
e.g., I.R.C. § 173 (circulation expenses); id. § 174 (research and experimental expenses), id. §
175 (soil and water conservation expenses); id. § 180 (expenditures by farmers for fertilizer).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27. For further discussion, see also infra text
accompanying notes 216-25.

92. Validity of the immediate-expense/yield exemption equivalence approach is not uniformly
accepted. For a critique of some of its underlying assumptions, see Graetz, Implementing a
Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575, 1598-1611 (1979).
93. Johnson, supra note 3, at 1019.
94. Change to a system based on true economic depreciation is also called for based on
other tax policy considerations, most importantly, the objective of horizontal equity. Despite

proposals for a movement to economic depreciation, Congress persists in allowing accelerated
forms of depreciation for certain assets. Retaining these accelerated schedules is justified by

the perceived need to stimulate investment in certain sectors of the economy.
95. See supra note 87.
96. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 merely modified ACRS rather than eliminated it entirely.
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 201(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2121-39 (modification of
accelerated cost recovery system codified as amended at I.R.C. § 168 (1986)). See supranote 86.
97. But see Mundstock, Accelerated Depreciation and the Interest Deduction: Can Two
Rights Really Make a Wrong?, 29 TAx NoTES 1253 (1985) (author believes the problem of
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g. Problems With Basis
Another major difficulty with the tax treatment of borrowing transactions is the long accepted notion that borrowed funds used to acquire
property are included fully within the taxpayer's basis. When borrowed
funds are used to acquire depreciable property, yearly depreciation is
computed based on a percentage of the full cost basis. The Supreme
Court accepted this concept of basis as applied to both recourse and
nonrecourse borrowing in its landmark 1947 decision in Crane v. Commissioner.98 In Commissionerv. Tufts,9 the Court further held that
basis and amount realized on resale subject to a nonrecourse liability
include the full amount of liability even if the liability exceeds the fair
market value of the property. 1°0
Congress's response to much of the escalation in tax sheltering in
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 can be traced to the decision in Crane,
reaffirmed in Tufts, that basis includes the full cost of property, including nonrecourse mortgage amounts. Inclusion of such mortgages in
basis expanded the availability of various rate arbitrage opportunities
discussed above.
3. Pure Time Arbitrage Problems: Capitalization Rules
In some cases, tax benefits can be achieved through borrowing
even though income from the investment will ultimately be taxed at
ordinary income rates and is not subject to any particular tax preference. Tax benefits are available to taxpayers who deduct interest
expense in advance of receiving even ordinary income related to the
expense.

"depreciation arbitrage" is overstated and that restrictions on interest expense incurred in
connection with such investments are premature). See infra text accompanying notes 143-49
(discusses the new passive loss rules).
98. 331 U.S. 1 (1947). The Court in Crane recognized long-standing Treasury practice as
one of the rationales for its holding, stating that while the 'Treasury has never furnished a
guide through the maze of problems that arise in connection with depreciating an equity basis,
but, ... has consistently permitted the amount of depreciation allowances to be computed on
the full value of the property, and subtracted from it as a basis." Id. at 10.
99. 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
100. Numerous articles and notes have been written on the Crane case and its progeny.
See, e.g., Adams, Exploringthe OuterBoundariesof the CraneDoctrine:An ImaginarySupreme
Court Opinion, 21 TAx L. REv. 159 (1966); Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt and the
Crane Case, 33 TAx L. REV. 277 (1978); Del Cotto, supra note 68; Simmons, Nonrecourse Debt
and Amount Realized: The Demise of Crane's Footnote 37, 59 OR. L. REV. 3 (1980); Note,
FederalIncome Tax Treatment of Nonrecourse Debt, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1498 (1982).
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One example of this problem involves "production period interest"
and inventory costs incurred in connection with the taxpayer's production or acquisition of assets for resale. The taxpayer may incur interest
and other expenses in connection with production or acquisition, but
will not receive income from such assets until a subsequent tax period
when the asset is actually sold. Congress recently expanded capitalization rules requiring taxpayers to amortize such costs, including interest expense. 1 1 For purposes of this article, tax benefits achieved
by the timing of income and deductions absent specific tax preferences
will be referred to as 'time arbitrage."
4. Interest in the Corporate Setting
Despite proposals for integration of the tax system, 102 current law
continues to treat corporations as distinct taxable entities. If Congress
is to be true to the notion of the corporate taxpayer as a taxable
entity separate and distinct from its shareholders, the definition of
income for corporate and individual taxpayers should be similar.'03 4
Like individuals, corporations incur substantial interest expense.0

Corporate interest expense may be incurred directly in connection
101. See also infr. text accompanying notes 150-59.
102. A complete discussion of proposals for integration of corporate and individual income
taxes is beyond the scope of this article. For thorough discussions of such proposals, see STAFF
OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 95TH CONG., 1ST SEss., TAX POLICY AND
CAPITAL FORMATION 9-17 (Comm. Print 1977); C. McLURE, JR., MUST CORPORATE INCOME
BE TAXED TWICE? (1979); Peel, A Proposalfor Eliminating Double Taxation of Corporate
Ditidends, 39 TAX LAW. 1 (1985).
103. For the most part, this is the case. Understandably, though, the corporate taxpayer
is not entitled to deductions for personal exemptions, dependents, or medical expenses. Another
distinction is the dividends received deduction, which is available only to corporate shareholders.
This deduction, found in I.R.C. § 243, is provided to alleviate the multiple layers of taxation
that would otherwise occur when stock is owned by a corporation which is in turn, of course,
owned by individuals. I.R.C. § 243(a).
104. Although questions regarding the proper measurement of business or investment of
income are generally the same for individual and corporate taxpayers, corporations have found
ways to use their distinct status to provide leveraging opportunities not available to individual
taxpayers. A 1983 Senate Finance Committee staff report, STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON
FINANCE, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., THE REFORM AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS (Comm. Print 1983), described a corporation with substantial
active income that was able to shelter by borrowing at 12% and investing in 10% preferred
stock of an unrelated corporation. The dividends received were more than offset by deductions
for interest paid under § 163 and dividends received deductions under § 243. To curb such
sheltering opportunities, the Finance Committee staff recommended limitations on deductions
of interest expense "incurred to purchase or carry stock producing dividends eligible for the
dividends received deduction." Id. at 79. Instead, I.R.C. § 246A, as passed by the House and
Senate in 1984, restricts the corporate dividends received deduction on dividends distributed
with respect to debt-financed portfolio stock. I.R.C. § 246A.
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with the purchase of assets or materials necessary for the ongoing
operation of the business, or in connection with capital raised by the
issuance of debt as opposed to stock.1°1 Historically, corporate taxpayers have been able to deduct both kinds of interest expense but
not dividends paid to stockholders.1°6
A detailed discussion of the corporate debt-equity problem is
beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, because corporations
as well as individuals must properly measure business and investment
income, the proposals developed below should apply equally to corporate taxpayers in that context. 1°7
III.

TREATMENT OF INTEREST EXPENSE IN THE

NEW

WORLD

A. Development of Limitations on Interest Deductibility
Since 1913, the Internal Revenue Code has moved further and
further away from the universal deductibility of interest. The following
discussion briefly describes the many categories of interest limitations
presently in the Code. Each interest limitation category can be viewed
as a direct response to one or more of the flaws in the tax base
outlined in section II.
1. Complete Disallowance Provisions: Congressional Response
to Tax-Exempt Income
a. Statutorily-Exempt Income
Among the earliest statutory restrictions on interest deductions
was a provision enacted in 1917 to prohibit an interest deduction for
indebtedness "incurred for the purchase of ... securities the interest

upon which is exempt." °8 The principle underlying this predecessor
to present day section 265 is straight-forward. If the federal income

105. It might be noted here that similar problems in distinguishing debt versus equity can
arise in the partnership context. Partners may lend funds to the partnership or they may make
capital contributions. See I.R.C. §§ 707, 721; Treas. Reg. §§ 1.707-1(a), 1.721-1(a) (1988).
106. Section 163 does not generally distinguish between different kinds of debt incurred by
corporate taxpayers.
107. It might be noted, however, that denial of the corporate interest deduction has been
considered as a second best alternative to complete integration of the corporate and individual
tax. See, e.g., Bierman & Bierman, A CorporateTax Reform Proposal,33 TAx NOTES 841, 843
(1986); Warren, The Corporate Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83 YALE L.J. 1585
(1974). Professor Warren later retracted his argument for denial of corporate interest deduction,
however. See Warren, The Relation and Integrationof Individual and CorporateIncome Taxes,
94 HARv. L. REV. 717, 734 n.43 (1981).
108. War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, Tit. XII, § 1207, 40 Stat. 300, 334.
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tax is to be imposed on net income, genuine costs of earning income
must be subtracted in determining the proper amount to be taxed.
Congress has, however, exempted certain income from taxation. If
the costs of generating this tax-exempt income are deductible, the
taxpayer may be able to generate a tax loss when there has in fact
been economic gain. In response to the double benefit allowable if
tax-exempt earners could also deduct interest incurred in the acquisition, section 265 disallows the deduction of "interest on indebtedness
incurred or continued to purchase or carry obligations the interest on
which is wholly exempt from taxes imposed by this subtitle .... 09
Although section 265 prohibits interest deductions in many such cases,
it has been unsuccessful in catching all shelter cases. Because money
and interest are generally fungible, it is difficult to determine when
interest expense is actually incurred or continued in connection with
the purchase of assets generating tax-exempt income.
Neither the statutory provisions of section 265(a) nor the regulations provide a specific method for determining when interest is "incurred or continued to purchase or carry" tax-exempt instruments. The
Service provides such guidance in Rev. Proc. 72-1810° in which the
Service adopted a tracing method of allocation. Under this method,
interest is treated as incurred to purchase tax-exempt instruments,
if the debt is "directly traceable" to such purchase, and to carry such
instruments when tax-exempt obligations are used as collateral.
Absent direct evidence tracing particular debt to the purchase or
carry of tax-exempt obligations, the section 265 restrictions will apply
"only if the totality of facts and circumstances supports a reasonable
inference that the purpose to purchase or carry tax-exempt obligations
exists."'1 1 The Service bases the latter "purpose rule" on clear evidence
that Congress intended interest limitations to apply only when the
taxpayer borrowed with the purpose of purchasing or carrying taxexempt obligations.'1 Nevertheless, Rev. Proc. 72-18 provides that:

109. I.R.C. § 265(a)(2). Section 265 also prohibits the deduction of interest incurred or
continued to purchase or carry stock of regulated investment companies that distributed exemptinterest dividends during the taxable year, id. § 265(a)(4), as well as interest paid or incurred
in connection with certain short sales. Id. § 265(a)(5).
110. Rev. Proc. 72-18, 1972-1 C.B. 740, nwdified by Rev. Proc. 74-8, 1974-1 C.B. 419
(clarifying definitions of "portfolio investment" and "active conduct of a trade or business"),
modified by Rev. Proc. 87-53, 1987-2 C.B. 669 (dealing with treatment of nonsalable tax-exempt
obligations).
111. Id. at 741 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 740 (Service cites to the legislative history of I.R.C. § 265).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1988

29

Florida Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [1988], Art. 3

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

[A] purpose to carry tax-exempt obligations will be inferred,

unless rebutted by other evidence, wherever the taxpayer
has outstanding indebtedness which is not directly connected
with personal expenditures... and is not incurred or continued in connection with the active conduct of a trade or
business . . . and the taxpayer owns tax-exempt obliga-

tions. 113
This part of the Procedure suggests a '"priority" method for allocating
any interest not directly traceable. Interest expense not attributable
to personal or trade or business activity is presumed to be attributable
first to tax-exempt obligation holdings.1 4 Later in the Procedure, the
Service provides a formula that appears to apply a pro rata allocation
method." 5 Needless to say, the proper method of allocation under
section 265(a), when direct tracing is not possible, is elusive and has
generated a substantial volume of litigation.16

With respect to financial institutions investing in tax-exempt obligations, Congress recently adopted a special pro rata allocation rule
that disallows interest deductions to the extent allocable to tax-exempt

obligations. The numerator for the allocation formula is the average
adjusted basis of tax-exempt obligations, and the denominator is the

average adjusted basis of all assets." 7 Explaining its reason for adoption of a pro rata method of allocation, the House Ways and Means
Committee stated, "The committee believes that this proportional dis-

113. Id. at 741.
114. For further discussion of priority interest allocation methods, see infra text accompanying notes 173-76.
115. Section 7.02 provides that when no direct evidence of a purpose to purchase or carry
tax-exempt obligations exists, "an allocable portion" shall be disallowed. Rev. Proc. 72-18, 1972-1
C.B. 740, 743.
[Tihe amount of interest on such indebtedness to be disallowed shall be determined
by multiplying the total interest on such indebtedness by a fraction, the numerator
of which is the average amount during the taxable year of the taxpayer's tax-exempt
obligations (valued at their adjusted basis) and the denominator of which is the
average amount during the taxable year of the taxpayers total assets (valued at
their adjusted basis) minus the amount of any indebtedness the interest on which
is not subject to disallowance to any extent under this Revenue Procedure.
Id. at 743.
116. For a detailed analysis of allocations issues and case law under § 265, see Note, The
Deductibility of Interest Costs by a Taxpayer Holding Tax-Exempt Obligations: A Neutral
Principle of Allocation, 61 VA. L. REv. 211 (1975).
117. I.R.C. § 265(b)(2), added by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 902(a),
100 Stat. 2085, 2380. Prior to this change, a similar provision was included as a corporate
preference item subject to 20% reduction. See I.R.C. § 291(e)(1)(B) (1986) (continues to apply
to tax-exempt obligations acquired before August 8, 1986).
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allowance rule is appropriate because of the difficulty of tracing funds
within a financial institution, and the near impossibility of assessing
a financial institution's 'purpose' in accepting particular deposits."1 s

Although the Committee indicated its purpose was to place "financial institutions on approximately an equal footing with payers,"1119

the allocation method adopted is quite distinct from the method
used for other taxpayers. This difference is partially attributable
to the legislative history behind section 265, which indicates that
Congress intended its restrictions to apply only when the taxpayer
incurred debt for the purpose of purchasing or carrying tax-exempt
obligations.'2 Section 265(b) adopts a different allocation method ostensibly because determining the purpose of a financial institution's indebtedness is likely to be more difficult than determining such purpose
for other taxpayers.
An interest provision similar to section 265 appears in section 264,
which disallows interest incurred to purchase or carry certain life
insurance policies. 1 Life insurance contracts are tax-preferred both
because benefits paid on death of the insured are excluded from income
of the beneficiary,'2 and because the inside build-up in policies with
substantial investment components is not subject to tax. Borrowing
to invest in such policies provides rate arbitrage opportunities that
Congress attempted to curb through the denial of interest deductions
in section 264.m Numerous additional variations on complete interest
disallowance provisions are buried elsewhere in the Code.12
118. H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 588-89 (1986).
119. Id. at 589. This reference undoubtedly refers to the fact that until recently, the § 265
interest limitations were not generally applicable to financial institutions. Section 291(e)(1)(B)
added by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 204, 96
Stat. 324, 423, limited financial institution interest deductions by 20%. New § 265(b) fully extends
the interest limitations of § 265 to financial institutions. I.R.C. § 265.
120. See H. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 584 (1986) (the House Ways and Means
Committee cites to this history).
121. See I.R.C. §§ 264(a)(2)-(4).
122. Id. § 101.
123. As pointed out in recent hearings, however, such interest limitations are easily avoided.
Hearings on Investment Uses of Life Insurance Before the Subcommittee on Select Revenue
Measures of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (statement
of Dennis E. Ross, Deputy Ass't Sec. (Tax Policy), Dep't of the Treasury).
124. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 246A (reduction of corporate dividends received deduction for debtfinanced portfolio stock); id. § 279 (disallowance of interest with respect to certain corporate
acquisition indebtedness); id. § 514 (including in the unrelated business taxable income of certain
tax-exempt organizations certain "debt-financed income"); see also id. § 170(t)(5)(3) (reduces
the taxpayer's charitable contribution deduction by interest on indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase or carry a bond contributed to charity). The § 170(X(5)(B) reduction is limited
to interest attributable to the period before contribution.
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b. Imputed Income
Until 1986, the section 163(a) deduction for "all interest paid or
accrued" was justified on administrative grounds. Interest incurred
as an ordinary and necessary business expense was concededly deductible as a cost necessarily deductible to arrive at a proper measure of
net income. 12 The same treatment applied to interest incurred in connection with the production or collection of income.'2 On the other
hand, most commentators agreed that as a theoretical matter, deduction of interest incurred in connection with personal expenditures
should not be permitted.m Because personal expenditures on housing
and consumer durables give rise to nontaxable imputed income, costs
of generating that income should not be deductible. Given the fungibility of money, however, an educated taxpayer would simply use
available cash for personal expenditures and borrow in connection with
business and investment purchases. Stated another way, forcing distinctions between business and personal interest might create traps
for the unwary. Moreover, many viewed tracing of interest expense
to particular expenditures as administratively unfeasible.m
Despite concerns regarding administration of tracing requirements
necessitated by distinguishing some interest payments from others,
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 amended section 163, which now provides
that "no deduction shall be allowed under this chapter for personal
interest paid or accrued during the taxable year."
Despite this
straight-forward language, not all interest one may consider "personal"
is "personal interest" for purposes of section 163(h). Instead, "personal interest" as defined in section 163(h)(2) is a residual category
that includes any allowable interest other than:
1. trade or business interest (which is fully deductible);
2. investment interest covered by section 163(d);
3. passive activity interest covered by section 469;
130
4. "qualified residence interest" (which is also fully deductible).
125.
126.
127.

Id. § 162.
Id. § 212.
See R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 148-51 (rev. ed. 1976); Andrews,

PersonalDeductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARv. L. REV. 309, 382 (1972); Due, Personal
Deductions, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION 37, 52-54 (J. Pechman ed. 1977).
128. See, e.g., Bale, The Interest Dilemma, 21 CANADIAN TAX J. 317 (1973) (continued
use, and not simply the first use, of borrowed money determines deductibility of interest paid);
white, supra note 42 (difficult to match interest transaction to individual expense).
129. I.R.C. § 163(h)(1). The limitations enacted in § 163(h) did not go into full effect
immediately, but are being phased in during calendar years 1987 through 1990. Id. § 163(h)(6).
For purposes of computing the alternative minimum tax, however, the phase-in provisions shall
not apply. Id. § 56(b)(1)(C)(ii).
130. See id. § 163(h)(2). Almost before the ink had fully dried from the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, Congress tinkered with the definition of "qualified residence interest" by amending
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With the recent changes outlined above, Congress has increased
the extent to which interest incurred in connection with certain types
of expenditures will be deductible, while interest incurred in connection
with others will not. In addition to accounting complexities that the
necessary allocation rules create, taxpayers now face incentives to
arrange their borrowing transactions so as to come within deductible
rather than nondeductible categories of interest expense. New anti-avoidance provisions will be required. 113 Examples of such behavior have
surfaced already. In order to take advantage of the "qualified residence
indebtedness" exception, taxpayers are mortgaging residences in excess of actual borrowing needs and using cash for other purposes.
Owners of highly appreciated apartments in large cooperative apartment buildings are selling their apartments and buying identical apartments in the building through heavily leveraged transactions in order
1
to take full advantage of the qualified residence interest deduction. 3
Numerous similar manipulative strategies are available.

I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-203, § 10102, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1330-85. "Qualified

residence interest" is now defined in I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) to include acquisition indebtedness
including interest incurred in acquiring, constructing, or substantially improving any qualified
residence, id. § 163(h)3)(B), or home equity indebtedness with respect to any qualified residence,
id. § 163(h)(3)(A). Home equity indebtedness is further defined in § 163(h)(3)(C). The aggregate
amount of allowable acquisition indebtedness is now subject to a $1,000,000 ceiling and allowable
home equity indebtedness is subject to a separate $100,000 ceiling. Id. §§ 163(h)(3)(B)(ii), (C)(ii).
It should be noted that home equity indebtedness interest will now be deductible regardless of
the use of borrowed funds. Thus, for example, a home-owner may borrow against his or her
home and use the funds for a vacation. The interest will be deductible. A renter who borrows
for the same vacation will not be entitled to deduct the interest expense. Such violations of
horizontal equity are outrageous and should be eliminated. For purposes of the alternative
minimum tax, however, only qualified housing interest (as opposed to qualified residence interest)
is allowed. See id. §§ 56(b)(1)(C)(i), 56(e).
For some examples of application of the new provisions, see Galvin, The Deduction of Nonbusiness Interest: An Exercise in Planned Confusion, 41 TAx LAW. 803, 807-14 (1988).
131. Regulations regarding the allocation of interest under §§ 163(d) & (h) were recently
released. Temp. Reg. § 1.163-8T (1987). These regulations opted for specific tracing of interest
expense as opposed to an allocation method. For a discussion of the considerations that entered
into this decision, see Rubin, Pro Rata Interest Allocation: The Path Not Chosen, 36 TAx
NOTES 301 (1987). In providing background information for the new regulations, the Service
indicated that it was aware of and considering rules to prevent taxpayer abuse of the allocation
provisions. T.D. 8145, 1987-2 C.B. 47, 50. See also infra text accompanying notes 160-201. The
Treasury Department also recently released regulations on the new personal interest rules,
Temp. Reg. § 1.163-9T (1988), and on qualified residence exception, Temp. Reg. § 1.163-10T
(1988).
132. Report by M. Carr Ferguson, Esq. at panel discussion entitled "Non-Business Interest
Deduction," American Bar Association, Tax Section Meetings (May 15, 1988).
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2. Deferral Provisions
a. Investment Interest Limitations: Response to Tax Arbitrage From
Unrealized Appreciation and Capital Gains Rates
In large part, the section 163(d) limits on interest deductibility
represent a response to the exclusion of unrealized appreciation from
the tax base. 133 Congress added this provision when it discovered
taxpayers were incurring substantial deductible interest expense on
growth investments that initially produced little income. Such deductions were used to offset income from other sources. At first glance,
then, section 163(d) apparently addresses a time arbitrage issue.134
Viewed more closely, however, the problem addressed by section
163(d) is one of rate arbitrage. The investments covered by section
163(d) in fact generated income in the Haig-Simons sense, but this
income was not taxable due to the omission of unrealized appreciation
from the tax base. Moreover, when the gains were taxed, the income
was included at lower capital gains rate. As the Joint Committee staff
explained:
Where a taxpayer's investment produces little or no current
income, the effect of allowing a current deduction for interest
on funds used to make the investment is to allow the interest
deduction to offset other ordinary income even though the
gains finally obtained from the investments might result in
capital gains.13

133. This provision was first added by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172,
§ 221(a), 83 Stat. 487, 574-76 (current version at I.R.C. § 163(d)(1987)). Section 163(d)(1) provides:
"In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, the amount allowed as a deduction under

this chapter for investment interest for any taxable year shall not exceed the net investment
income of the taxpayer for the taxable year." I.R.C. § 163(d)(1). The role of § 163(d) is today

largely superseded by § 469, which restricts deductions of passive activity losses except to the
extent of passive activity income. The jurisdictional overlap of these two sections is one of many
complicating factors in determining the proper treatment of interest under current law. For a
detailed discussion, see infra note 143-49.
Another similar interest deferral provision is found in I.R.C. § 1277, which provides that
"the net interest expense with respect to any market discount bond shall be allowed as a
deduction for the taxable year only to the extent that such expense exceeds the portion of the

market discount allocable to the days during the taxable year on which such bond was held by
the taxpayer .. ." I.R.C. § 1277(a). Disallowed interest may be carried forward and deducted
as an offset to net interest income with respect to market discount bonds or deducted for the
year of disposition of the bond. Id. § 1277(b).
134.

For a definition of time arbitrage, see supra text accompanying notes 101.

135.

STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION 91ST CONG.,

1ST

SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, 98 (Comm. Print 1970).
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Section 163(d) responds only in a minor way to arbitrage possibilities created by the omission of unrealized gains in the tax base.
First, it only applies to investment income and expense not derived
from the conduct of a trade or business. Surely, taxpayers engaged
in trade or business similarly benefit from leveraging in connection
with acquisition of appreciating assets. In addition, the provision does
not apply to corporate taxpayers. The limited scope of section 163(d)
may be explained by Congress's desire to focus on abusive leveraging
by taxpayers involved in sheltering activity as opposed to the more
day-to-day sheltering that occurs in the business setting.
b. At Risk Rules: Response to Arbitrage From Accelerated Depreciation,
Capital Gains Rates, and Use of Full Cost Basis
Much of the tax sheltering escalation that Congress responded to
in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 can be directly traced to the decision
in Crane, reaffirmed in Tufts, that basis includes the full cost of property, including nonrecourse mortgage amounts."1 Such full cost basis
allowed taxpayers to take full accelerated depreciation and other deductions with little or no equity investment. One obvious answer to
this tax shelter problem would be to statutorily overrule the Crane
decision and move to the equity concept of basis the Court rejected
there. Several commentators have made similar proposals regarding
depreciable property. 137
In the meantime, Congress responded to the particular problems
raised by nonrecourse borrowing with section 465. This provision,
added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976,m permits loss deductions for
specified activities only to the extent that the taxpayer is "at-risk."
A taxpayer is considered at-risk with respect to borrowed funds only
to the extent that he or she is personally liable for the debt or has
pledged property other than property used in the activity as security. 139
The section 465 at-risk rules originally did not apply to real estate
transactions. As a result, substantial tax shelter activity was directed

136. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100. Even limited partners can include their
pro rata share of nonrecourse mortgages in the basis of their limited partnership interests.
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1988).
137. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 1013-20, 1049; McMahon, Reforming Cost Recovery
Allowances for Debt FinancedDepreciable Property, 29 ST. LouIs U.L.J. 1029 (1985); Note,
Federal Income Tax Treatment of Nonrecourse Debt, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1498 (1982).
138. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 204, 90 Stat. 1520, 1531-33 (current
version at I.R.C. § 465 (1986)).
139. I.R.C. § 465(b)(2).
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toward the real estate industry. Congress finally extended the application of the at-risk rules to real estate ventures in the Tax Reform
Act of 1986.140
More significantly, the at-risk rules focus on nonrecourse borrowing
alone. However, recourse borrowing similarly provides the taxpayer
with a non-equity basis in property, and thus expands tax arbitrage
opportunities through accelerated deductions. 141 Admittedly, the taxpayer's personal liability for the loan provides a stronger claim for
the presumption of repayment and hence a stronger case for the inclusion of borrowed amounts in basis. Nevertheless, including such borrowed funds in basis creates leveraging opportunities for the taxpayer
that should be curbed as well.'4
c. Passive Loss Rules: Further Response to Arbitrage From
Accelerated Depreciation, Capital Gains Rates, and Use of Full Cost Basis
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, when the taxpayer was
at-risk, or when the taxpayer invested in transactions where section
465 did not apply, inclusion of borrowed amounts in basis for purposes
of depreciation and other deductions allowed the taxpayer to generate
losses in early years. These losses offset other income before the
investment itself generated any income. In a provision reputedly dealing the death knell to tax sheltering, the Tax Reform Act of 1986
created section 469 to respond to such problems.'4
Section 469 focuses on tax shelter or "passive" investors. Those
who materially participate in a trade or business are not restricted in
their ability to deduct losses in advance of income from the trade or
business. Unlike section 163(d), which focuses exclusively on interest,
section 469 is broadly focused on all losses generated by passive activities. Although the deduction of interest expense in advance of
income receipts plays an important role in the generation of such

140. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 503, 100 Stat. 2085, 2243. At the same
time, however, Congress provided for a type of "qualified nonrecourse financing" incurred with
respect to the holding of real property that is to be considered an at-risk amount for purposes
of § 465. Id. § 503(b) (codified at I.R.C. § 465(b)(6) (1986)).
141. For a rather forceful argument that nonrecourse debt cannot be practically distinguished from recourse debt and that § 465 is unnecessary, see Coven, supra note 21.
142. Professor Coven's argument that recourse and nonrecourse borrowing are indistinguish-

able as a practical matter cuts two ways. He argues that the inability to distinguish calls for
repeal of the at-risk rules. Id. at 41-42. On the other hand, such indistinguishability may call

for extension of at-risk-like principles to all borrowing transactions.
143. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 503, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 469 (1986)). For a recent and detailed analysis of the new passive loss rules, see Peroni, A
Policy Critique of the § 469 Passive Loss Rule, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1988).
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losses, other advance deductions create similar concerns and are also
limited by section 469.
New section 469 generally disallows deductions for losses from
passive activities except to the extent of gains from similar activities. 144
A "passive activity" is one "(A) which involves the conduct of a trade
or business, and (B) in which the taxpayer does not materially participate." 115 The 'trade or business" in which the passive participant invests, however, may itself have portfolio income unrelated to the
conduct of the business. Allowing passive investors to consider their
share of that portfolio income as gain from a passive activity to be
offset by losses would defeat the purpose of section 469. Such unrelated
portfolio income resembles the taxpayer's other nonpassive income.
This income should not be offset by passive losses generated by interest and other deductions. Thus, in determining income or loss from
a passive activity, gross income and expenses attributable to "interest,
dividends, annuities, or royalties not4 6 derived in the ordinary course
of. . . business" must be excluded.
Jurisdictional differences and overlaps between sections 163(d) and
469 as applied to interest expense will generate tremendous complexity
and uncertainty for taxpayers. Section 469 generally covers investors
in a "trade or business" who are not materially participating in the
conduct of the business. Section 163(d), on the other hand, applies to
investment income "not derived from the conduct of a trade or busi47 Apparently then, section 163(d) applies primarily to portfolioness. 11
type investments while section 469 applies primarily to passive investors in an otherwise active business. However, section 469(c)(6) provides that the term 'trade or business" includes production of income
activities for which section 212 expenses are generally allowable. Such
activities may be regarded as investment activities that otherwise
might be covered by section 163(d). Section 163(d) provides, however,
that "[i]nvestment income and investment expenses shall not include
any income or expenses taken into account under section 469 in com-

144. 'Passive activity loss" is defined as: "the amount (if any) by which - A) the aggregate
losses from all passive activities for the taxable year, exceed B) the aggregate income from all
passive activities for such year." I.R.C. § 469(d)(1) (1986). Such "passive activity losses" are
disallowed for the taxable year but may be carried forward to succeeding years. Id. §§ 469(a)(1),
(b).
145. Id. § 469(c)(1).
146. Id. § 469(e)(1).
147. Id. § 163(d)(4)(B)(ii).
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puting income or loss from a passive activity."' Section 163(d) 49 takes
interest attributable to section 469(e) portfolio income into account.
d. Uniform Capitalization Rules: Response to Time Arbitrage
Prior to its repeal by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, section 189
required the capitalization and amortization of real property construction period interest over a ten year period. 15° The Tax Reform Act
expanded the capitalization principles of old section 189. It also substituted new uniform capitalization rules. These rules apply to all direct
and indirect costs associated with real or tangible property produced
by the taxpayer. They also apply to real or personal capital assets
acquired by the taxpayer for resale. The taxpayer must capitalize
direct and indirect costs allocable to such property pursuant to new
section 263A.1'5'
According to the legislative history of the Tax Reform Act, Congress adopted the uniform capitalization rules to resolve two perceived
deficiencies:
First, the existing [pre-1986] rules may allow costs that are
in reality costs of producing, acquiring, or carrying property
to be deducted currently, rather than capitalized into the
basis of the property and recovered when the property is
sold or as it is used by the taxpayer. This produces a mismatching of expenses and the related income and an unwarranted deferral of taxes. Second, different capitalization rules
may apply under present law depending on the nature of
the property and its intended use. These differences may
create distortions in the allocation of economic resources and
the manner in which certain economic activity is organized. 5 2
Although section 263A includes interest expense among the indirect
costs required to be capitalized, it also applies a series of special rules

148.

Id. § 163(d)(4)(D).

149.

Id. § 163(d)(5)(A) provides that for purposes of § 163(d), "property held for investment"

includes "any property which produces income of a type described in section 469(e)(1) .... "
150. Section 189 was added to the Code by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-455, § 201(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1525-27, repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-514, § 803(b)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2355.
151. In the case of inventory, such costs are to be included in inventory costs. I.R.C. §
263A(a)(1)(A).
152. S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 140 (1986); see also H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th

Cong., 1st Sess. 625 (1986).
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to interest expense.a 3 First, the interest capitalization rules apply

only to production period interest allocable to a more narrow class of
property than that used for purposes of section 263A generally. 154 In
this respect, the uniform capitalization rules applicable to interest are
too narrow. Surely, consistent with the philosophy of section 263A,
any interest costs incurred in connection with the production of future
income should be capitalized. 55
Next, the special rules provide for specific allocation procedures.
The taxpayer must first capitalize interest directly attributable or
traceable to production period expenses.'5 In addition, "interest on
any other indebtedness shall be assigned to such property to the
extent that the taxpayer's interest costs could have been reduced if
production expenditures (not attributable to indebtedness described
in clause (i)) had not been incurred."' ? This allocation method is similar
to the "avoided cost" method under old section 189. According to the
Senate Finance Committee, "[u]nder these rules, any interest expense
that would have been avoided if production or construction expenditures had been used to repay indebtedness of the taxpayer is treated

as construction period interest subject to capitalization."' 8

153. I.R.C. § 263A(f). Interest expenses attributable to certain straddle transactions are
subject to yet another set of special rules. See id. § 263A(g); see also id. § 266 (capitalization
of amounts paid or accrued for taxes and carrying charges). The Treasury Department recently
released Temporary and Proposed regulations under § 263A but announced that rules for capitalization of interest under § 263A(f) would be forthcoming in a separate document. T.D. 8131,
1987-1 C.B. 98. In the interim, the Treasury Department issued guidelines in Notice 88-99,
1988-36 I.R.B. 29.
154. Conpare I.R.C. § 263A(b) with id. § 263A(f)(1). Pursuant to § 263A(f)(1)(B), the
interest capitalization rules are applicable only to real or tangible personal property that has a
long useful life, an estimated production period exceeding two years, or an estimated production
period exceeding one year and a cost exceeding $1,000,000. Id. § 263A(f)(1)(B).
155. While the legislative history is silent on this point, it may well be that the special
interest rules were designed as a "de minimis" exception. Given the fungibility of money and
resulting allocation problems, capitalization of interest expense is likely to be more administratively difficult than capitalization of other expenses. If this is so, however, similar "de mininis"
exceptions should be applied uniformly in all settings regarding interest deduction limitations.
156. I.R.C. § 263A(f)(2)(A)(i). Recent guidelines issued by the Treasury Department specify
that such 'traced debt" is to be determined by applying the tracing rules in Temp. Reg. § 1.163ST. Notice 88-99, 1988-36 I.R.B. 29, 31.
157. I.R.C. § 263A(f)(2)(A)(ii).
158. S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 144 (1986). Notice 88-99, supra note 156,
recently issued by the Treasury Department, provides examples applying the tracing and avoided
costs method. 1988-36 I.R.B. at 31-32. In addition, the Notice provides anti-abuse rules applicable
to related parties. Id. at 35-40.
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The "avoided cost" allocation method adopted by the uniform
capitalization rules effectively allocates interest beyond that directly
traceable to production expenditures first to property requiring interest capitalization. This type of anti-taxpayer "stacldng" is quite
different from the tracing rules the Service adopted in the new section
163 regulations and the pro rata method adopted, for example, in the
section 861 regulations to determine United States source income of
multinational taxpayers. 159
3. Summary
By now, the reader's head, not to mention the heads of taxpayers
subject to the provisions outlined above, must be spinning. Interest
expense is in some cases now fully deductible, in others, not at all
deductible, and in still others, partially deductible with disallowed
amounts carried forward to future years. Determining which of many
interest provisions applies is difficult. Perhaps the most difficult challenge for taxpayers is to determine the interest allocable to each of
many necessary categories. The following section of this article
explores various allocation options.
B. Allocation of Interest Expense in the New World
1. The Options
a. Pro Rata Allocation
Because money is fungible, interest attributable to borrowing incurred to fund a particular asset supports not only that asset, but frees
cash enabling the taxpayer to acquire or carry other assets as well.
If this is so, the taxpayer should attribute interest expense to all
assets. Pursuing this theme, the interest allocation rules used to determine United States source income under section 861 adopt the
approach
[t]hat money is fungible and that interest expense is attributable to all activities and property regardless of any specific
purpose for incurring an obligation on which interest is paid.
This approach recognizes that all activities and property require funds and that management has a great deal of flexibility as to the source and use of funds. Normally, creditors

159. For further discussion of priority allocation rules, see infra text accompanying notes
173-76.
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of a taxpayer subject the money advanced to the taxpayer
to the risk of the taxpayer's entire activities and look to the
general credit of the taxpayer for payment of the debt. When
money is borrowed for a specific purpose, such borrowing
will generally free other funds for other purposes and it is
reasonable under this approach to attribute part of the cost
of borrowing to such other purposes.' °
In a preamble to its recent section 163 interest allocation regulations, the Treasury Department noted the advantages of a pro rata

method of apportionment that "accords with the notion that money is
fungible, regardless of whether borrowed or earned . .. .,
The
Treasury Department noted further that "[d]epending on the apportionment base, recordkeeping requirements may be less burdensome
than under a tracing regime. An apportionment approach may also

result in lower transaction costs because taxpayers would have less
incentive to arrange borrowings and expenditures based on the tax
consequences.' ' 6 2 Despite these advantages, the regulations reject the

pro rata approach in favor of tracing, and cite four reasons for rejecting
the former. The following discussion analyzes these four reasons and
suggests possible ways to overcome problems presented.
First, the Treasury was concerned that 'there is no theoretically
or practically satisfactory overall apportionment base."' 3 Apportion-

160. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(e)(2) (1988). Similar language appears in temporary regulations
recently issued by the Treasury Department regarding allocation of interest expense under §
864. Temp. Reg. § 1.861-9T (1988). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 added new § 864(e) entitled,
"Rules for Allocating Interest, Etc." Among other things, this new provision requires that for
purposes of Subchapter N, all "allocations and apportionments of interest expense shall be made
on the basis of assets rather than gross income." I.R.C. § 864(e)(2) (1988). The authority for
the regulatory provision cited in the text is I.R.C. § 861(b), which provides for deduction of
"expenses, losses, and other deductions properly apportioned or allocated [to United States
source gross income] and a ratable part of any expenses, losses, or other deductions which
cannot definitely be allocated to some item or class of gross income." I.R.C. § 862(b) contains
parallel language for determining taxable income from sources without the United States. The
fungibility theory of Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(e) assumes that interest expense in most cases cannot
definitely be allocated to some item or class of income. For a general discussion of the § 861
interest allocation rules, see Feinschreiber, Allocation and Apportionment of Interest, 3 IN'rL
TAX J. 538 (1977). It should be noted, however, that the option to apportion interest based on
gross income covered in the latter part of this article is no longer available. See I.R.C. § 864(e)(2)
(added by the Tax Reform Act of 1986). Congress has also explicitly adopted a pro rata allocation
method for financial institutions in new § 265(b). See supra text accompanying notes 117-20.
161. T.D. 8145, 1987-2 C.B. 47, 50.
162. Id.
163. Id. Problems with identifying a satisfactory apportionment base did not deter the
adoption of pro rata interest allocation in the § 861 United States source income provisions.
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ment based on fair market values requires "burdensome and otherwise
unnecessary" annual valuations of assets. Such burdens have long
provided justification for omitting unrealized appreciation from the
tax base. There is no reason to believe that reaction to a system
requiring annual appraisal of assets would be less objectionable in this
context, except perhaps in the case of marketable securities.
Another possible base for apportionment is adjusted or unadjusted
basis. The Treasury rejected this possibility without elaboration because "[t]he use of either adjusted or unadjusted basis as an apportionment base could distort the amount of debt associated with particular
assets."164

Concededly, general distortions may occur with some pro rata allocation techniques. For example, if no interest is allocated to noncapital expenditures, a bias might be created in favor of capital-intensive
industries and against labor-intensive industries. This concern, however, is unrelated to the particular apportionment base chosen. Under
either a fair market value or a basis allocation method, failure to
allocate to noncapital expenses may produce a bias in favor of capitalintensive industries. Although the feared distortion may call for rejection of pro rata allocation, it cannot serve as an objection to basis
allocation formulas in particular.
A distortion unique to an adjusted or unadjusted basis pro rata
apportionment formula would result from appreciation or depreciation
of the taxpayer's assets at different rates. Allocation of interest based
on original unadjusted basis under such circumstances would not be
the ideal approach. Unadjusted basis will have little, if any, correlation
to actual value. To use adjusted basis for purposes of allocation also
is less than ideal. Because ACRS deductions do not approximate true

The § 861 regulations permit the use of either tax book value or fair market value as a basis
for apportionment of interest expense. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(e)(2)(v) provides:
If a taxpayer consistently apportions the deduction for interest on the basis of the
tax book value (original cost for tax purposes less depreciation allowed for tax
purposes) of its assets, that method will ordinarily be accepted. Alternatively, if
a taxpayer can apportion the deduction on the basis of the fair market value of
his assets and he can establish the fair market value to the satisfaction of the
Commissioner, that method will also be acceptable. However, once the taxpayer
uses fair market value the taxpayer must continue to use such method unless
expressly authorized by the Commissioner to change his method.
Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(e)(2)(v) (1988). For an analysis and critique of this asset method apportionment, see Feinschreiber, supra note 160, at 545-49.
164. T.D. 8145, 1987-2 C.B. 47, 50. It should be noted here that § 265(b) adopts adjusted
basis as its apportionment base for financial institutions. See supra note 117.
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economic decline in value, adjusted basis figures have little relationship
to actual value. The effects of such distortion could be minimized by
using a fair market value allocation system for those assets capable
of ready valuation such as marketable securities. The distortion would
remain as for other assets. The appropriate question then is whether
such distortion is tolerable. Is the distortion outweighed by more
significant problems with tracing or other allocation methods?
A second objection to a pro rata allocation system is that it requires
taxpayers to report either the basis or fair market value of all assets.
Taxpayers might view such disclosure as "unduly intrusive and burdensome." I This argument is rather weak. First, taxpayers at least must
keep records regarding the basis of their assets. If anything, requiring
taxpayers to keep such annual records would avoid difficulties frequently arising in later years. Taxpayers often sell or transfer assets
by gift or bequest and no longer have the documents necessary to
establish the original basis of the asset. Certainly, taxpayers must
disclose to the Internal Revenue Service the basis and sales price of
assets sold each year. Is the privacy right stronger with respect to
assets that have not been sold? In any event, many states require
taxpayers to report the value of all assets for personal property tax
purposes.1 6 Taxpayers residing in states with such personal property
taxes already have disclosed asset values.
A third objection to a pro rata allocation rule is more serious. As
noted above, unless some interest is allocated to noncapital expenditures such as current business expenses or personal consumption,
distortions may occur. As pointed out in the Treasury preamble, "any
general apportionment base would have to be adjusted in various ways
in order to allocate a reasonable amount of interest to noncapital
expenditures."1 Although creating a general apportionment base is
challenging, it is not impossible or even so difficult as to be rejected
out of hand.
Certainly, any general allocation base should include noncapital
business expenses as well as personal consumption items. As far as
noncapital business expenses are concerned, taxpayers need to keep
such records for section 162 business expense deduction purposes.
Keeping track of personal consumption expenditures might add objec-

165. See T.D. 8145, 1987-2 C.B. 47, 50.
166. State Tax Guide (CCH) 2005 (2d ed. 1980) ("Some tangible personal property is taxable
in nearly every state... ..."). For summaries of property taxes in the fifty states, see id. at
2041-2493.
167. T.D. 8145, 1987-2 C.B. 47, 50.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1988

43

Florida Law
Iss. 4 [1988],
UNIVERSITY
OF Review,
FLORIDAVol.
LAW40,
REVIEW

Art. 3

[Vol. 40

tionable and burdensome recordkeeping requirements. On the other
hand, if one knows the level of total expenditures (including savings)
for a given year, one might safely assume that the residue is attributable to personal consumption. If this system is still viewed as overly
burdensome, limited exceptions and an alternative allocation method
might be made available to certain individual taxpayers.
As a final objection to a pro rata allocation method, the Treasury
preamble states that:
[A] rule apportioning debt among all of a taxpayer's assets
would distort certain economic decisions by ignoring the fact
that such decisions are made by comparing the marginal cost
of borrowing, the marginal return from an expenditure, and
the opportunity costs of liquidating other assets1 in order to
make the expenditure with unborrowed funds. 6
Such distortion only exists if one acknowledges a flaw in the underlying fungibility of money premise supporting a pro rata method of
allocation. Stated in a different fashion by one writer who was actively
involved in the development of recent interest allocation regulations,
the fungibility notion
[i]gnores practical constraints on the liquidation of assets.
Moreover, it ignores the fact that economic decisions are
made at the margin and that in many cases, if the taxpayer
were unable to borrow, he would forego the marginal use
of the funds rather than liquidating existing assets. As a
result, a pro rata allocation rule may distort economic decisiomaking. 169
Because the term '"marginal use" is often used in other contexts,
this theory might better be referred to as the discretionary borrowing
theory. If true that taxpayers would forego the use of funds rather
than liquidate, interest should be allocated to those marginal expenditures that would not have been made absent access to borrowed
funds. To allocate interest expense to assets that the taxpayer never
would have liquidated is arguably inappropriate.
Even under this discretionary borrowing analysis, there is no
reason to believe that the feared distortion would be any different
under a basis as opposed to a fair market value pro rata allocation

168. Id. at 50.
169. See Rubin, supra note 131, at 304.
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method. Although the feared distortion may call for rejection of pro
rata allocation, it cannot serve as an objection to a basis allocation
formula in particular.
While the Treasury Department is concerned about the possible
distortions of a pro rata allocation formula, the tracing method adopted
by the new section 163 regulations creates distortions of a different
sort. Taxpayers will attempt to manipulate the tracing rules through
churning of assets and other techniques, thus distorting economic decisionmaking. If the Treasury is correct in its analysis of the potential
distortions produced by a pro rata apportionment formula, fundamental
questions arise. First, in weighing pro rata allocation against tracing,
is the economic distortion of the pro rata formula more serious than
the manipulation distortion of tracing? Second, is it administratively
feasible for the Treasury to adequately deal with such manipulative
behavior? Can regulations be drafted that respond to all primary forms
such manipulative behavior may take?
b. Collateral or Security Method
Some have suggested that interest expense be allocated to assets
securing the debt. 170 The home mortgage interest deduction is an example of such a security method of debt allocation already in operation.
Home mortgage interest must be secured by the residence to qualify
for interest deductions under section 163.171 A collateral or security
allocation system would arguably ease the taxpayer's compliance burdens and Internal Revenue Service's administrative burdens. In fact,
the Senate Finance Committee recently suggested that the Treasury
consider rules relating to the securing of property to mitigate
some of the complexities of tracing where simplicity is desirable, so that, for example, any interest on a loan secured

170. See, e.g., McMahon, supranote 137, at 1122-1130; Letter from David Berenson, Ernst
& Whinney, to Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service (Feb. 29, 1988) (public comment to
proposed § 163 regulations) [hereinafter Berenson letter]; Letter from Tax Division of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants to Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service
(Feb. 12, 1988) (public comment to proposed § 163 regulations). McIntyre, supra note 5, at
784-87, proposes physical tracing for purchase money loans. In many cases, this proposal would
allocate debt to the assets actually securing the debt. Professor McIntyre's proposal goes beyond
a collateral or security method, however, because he would trace loans when the "lender requires
the borrower to spend the loan proceeds for a previously agreed upon use." Id. at 784. Professor
McIntyre under this rule would allocate consumer credit given by department stores to particular
department store purchases. Id.
171. I.R.C. §§ 163(h)(3)(A)-(C).
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by personal use property could be considered personal interest, and any interest of a loan secured by investment
172
assets could be considered investment interest.
Nevertheless, this approach also has problems. First, a collateral
allocation method would not work regarding an unsecured debt.
Another system would be necessary to allocate interest on unsecured
loans. In addition, several assets may secure a particular debt. The
taxpayer would have to allocate debt among these assets. Moreover,
and perhaps most important, to the extent that taxpayers may choose
the particular collateral to secure certain loans, manipulation of the
rules is possible.
c. Priority System
A set of ordering rules might be established to rank interest limitation provisions. These rules could allocate interest serially to each
of several categories. One option for a stacking rule allocates interest
first to nondeductible categories. This anti-taxpayer approach is similar
to the "avoided cost" method used for uniform capitalization rules.'
This method presumes that the taxpayer borrowed first to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities, which should be curbed. The case for
such an anti-taxpayer stacking rule, as applied to personal interest at
least, also can be made without attributing such conscious motives to
the taxpayer. Allocating interest first to nondeductible categories may
serve as a proxy for taxing imputed income on home ownership and
other consumer durables. 74 Taxpayers benefit from the exclusion of
imputed income under the current tax regime and perhaps unknowingly engage in rate arbitrage by borrowing directly or indirectly to
carry expenses attributable to imputed income. Assuming that taxation
of imputed income is administratively and politically unfeasible, interest deduction limitations followed by allocation of interest first to
nondeductible categories may be a workable second-best solution.
At the other extreme, a stacking rule might allocate interest first
to deductible uses. Professor McIntyre proposed such an option. He
advocated an allocation system that first applied a direct physical
tracing rule for purchase-money loans. As a supplemental modified
physical tracing rule for untied loans, he proposed a priority system

172. SENATE FINANCE Comm. REPORT ON THE REVENUE AMENDMENTS OF 1987, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 272 (1987); see also HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS Comm. REPORT ON THE
REVENUE AMENDMENTS OF 1987, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1170 (1987).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 156-59.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49 & 125-32.
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that allocated interest first to those items such as current business
expenditures, for which the taxpayer would be entitled to full interest
deductions. 175 This alternative system would give all taxpayers the
tax benefits that would have been available if they had used untied
borrowing thus minimizing advantages to sophisticated tax planners
and eliminating traps for the unwary.
An alternative stacking rule would assign interest to those discretionary investments that the taxpayer would not have made but for
access to borrowed funds. This method responds to the observations
that economic decisions are made at the margin and that all borrowing
may not be fungible.Y6 Under a discretionary investment allocation
system, interest would be assigned first to the most discretionary
expenditure and in succession to the next most discretionary expenditure. One objection to such a system of allocation is that it would
involve difficult inquiries into the taxpayer's priorities and state of
mind. One variation of a discretionary borrowing approach that avoids
detailed inquiry into the taxpayer's state of mind builds on the notion
that discretionary or "marginal" borrowing for fully taxable investments may occur only at lower rates of interest than normal borrowing.
If the investment is truly discretionary and subject to taxation, then
the taxpayer may be unwilling to proceed at normal interest rates.
Tax favored investments, on the other hand, can bear higher rates of
interest. If these observations hold, they seem to call for a system
that allocates high interest borrowing to tax favored investments and
low interest borrowing to taxable investments.
Regardless of the stacking method chosen, each method involves
certain assumptions that may or may not be accurate. A "nondeductible
interest first" or anti-taxpayer stacking rule presumes that taxpayers
borrow first to engage in tax arbitrage activity or that the taxpayer
has substantial, untaxed inputed income. A "nondeductible interest
last" rule presumes that many, or perhaps most, taxpayers structure
their affairs to maximize interest deductions. It also presumes that
other, less sophisticated, taxpayers should have similar opportunities.

175.

See McIntyre, supra note 5, at 782-84, 787-88. Untied loan interest would be allocated

under this proposal:
First, to current business expenses for the year,
Second, to purchases of depreciable properties or other income producing properties
that generate an annual deduction under the tax system's cost recovery mechanisms;
Third, to purchases of other income producing property;
Fourth, to purchases of consumer durables; and
Fifth, to current consumption expenses.

Id. at 783 (citation omitted).
176.

See supra text accompanying notes 168-69.
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Allowing all taxpayers to benefit from manipulative transactions
that some taxpayers engage in strikes this author as wrong. This is
not to suggest that taxpayers who attempt to.maximize interest deductions necessarily engage in abusive behavior. Nevertheless, such taxpayers stretch interest deductibility beyond levels intended by Congress. If so, Congress should close loopholes rather than extend them
to all taxpayers. Finally, as noted earlier, a rule assigning interest
first to the taxpayer's most discretionary investments requires major
assumptions about which of the taxpayer's expenditures are most marginal or discretionary. Practical administrative problems make this
option unattractive. A pro rata allocation method assumes that borrowed funds carry all of the taxpayer's assets. Although this assumption too may not be absolutely accurate, it is the most even-handed
assumption.
d. Tracing Method
In its proposed section 163 regulations, the Treasury recently chose
direct tracing of debt proceeds to specific expenditures as its interest
allocation method. In a rare display of regulatory candor, the Treasury
Department, in its preamble to the new regulations, conceded the
difficulties with a tracing method of interest allocation.177 Perhaps the
most serious problem with a tracing method of interest allocation is
the potential for manipulation of the rules. Taxpayers will attempt to
use debt financing in those settings where interest is given more
favorable treatment and equity financing in other cases. In its preamble, the Treasury identifies several categories of potential manipulation
and indicates that it is considering rules to prevent abuse.
In addition to providing specific rules for tracing interest expense,
the proposed section 163 regulations establish a hierarchy of applicable
rules to coordinate the many restrictions on interest deductibility now
scattered throughout the Code. The following section provides a brief
description and critical analysis of these regulations.178
2. The New Section 163 Regulations
a. Tracing Rules
The new temporary and proposed regulations use direct tracing
rules to allocate interest expense to five basic categories:

177. T.D. 8145, 1987-2 C.B. 47, 50.
178. Because the content of these regulations may well change, the following discussion
will concentrate on the broad questions raised by the proposed § 163 regulations and avoids an
overly technical analysis of the provisions.
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1) trade or business expenditure;
2) passive activity expenditure;
3) investment expenditure;
4) personal expenditure; and
5) portfolio expenditure.179
Rejecting the collateral or security method, the regulations state that
"debt proceeds and related interest expense are allocated solely by
reference to the use of such proceeds, and the allocation is not affected
by the use of an interest in any property to secure the repayment of
such debt or interest."'s
Taxpayers must separately state interest allocable to the first category of trade or business expense so that it will remain fully deductible and not subject to the personal interest restrictions of section
163(h).1s1 Second, the taxpayer must separately list interest allocable
to passive activity expense as it is subject to the passive loss restrictions of section 469. Third, interest allocable to investment expense
is subject to section 163(d) limitations. Fourth, personal interest expense becomes nondeductible under section 163(h). Finally, interest
expense allocable to portfolio expenditures connected with passive
activities must be separately stated so that it is not taken into account
in computing gross income from passive activities to be offset by
passive losses. The section 163(d) rules cover such portfolio interest
expense.182 Of the five allocation categories listed above, "personal
expenditure" is the catch-all. Thus, interest attributable to any expenditure not classified in one of the other categories is nondeductible
personal interest expense.
If a taxpayer borrows funds for a specific and identifiable purpose,
direct tracing may be reasonably straight-forward. On the other hand,
when general debt proceeds are deposited in the borrower's account,
special rules are necessary. The new regulations first specify that
deposit of borrowed funds into an account falls into the investment
expenditure category. 18 The taxpayer must trace expenditures of
funds from such accounts thereafter. So, for example, if in mid-year
the taxpayer uses borrowed funds for personal expenses, he will have
to reallocate interest to the personal expenditure category. When bor-

179. These categories roughly correspond to those listed in the residual definition of "personal interest" in I.R.C. § 163(h)(2).
180. Temp. Reg. § 1.163-8T(c)(1) (1988).
181. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(A) (1987).
182. See id. §§ 163(d)(5) & 469(e).
183. Temp. Reg. § 1.163-ST(c)(4) (1988).
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rowed funds are commingled with other funds, the ordering rules of
the regulations treat debt proceeds as expended before unborrowed
amounts held in account at the time of deposit. The regulations also
treat debt proceeds as expended before any other amounts (borrowed
or unborrowed) deposited after the debt proceeds in question.18 A
special exception permits taxpayers to treat any expenditure made
within 15 days after deposit of debt proceeds as made from such
proceeds even if the ordering rules provide otherwise. 18 If taxpayers
keep segregated accounts consisting solely of debt proceeds, they
may treat expenditures from such accounts as made first from interest
186
as opposed to the debt proceeds themselves.
The special rules relating to a borrower's accounts will undoubtedly
increase the complexity of financial accounts. Taxpayers are more
likely to keep segregated accounts to take advantage of the special
rules regarding such accounts and to avoid the difficulty of determining
precisely when expenditures are made and whether they are made
from borrowed or other funds.
b. Coordination Rules
The five categories of interest expense named in the new regulations do not cover the complete range of provisions limiting interest
deductions. Numerous additional Code provisions, many of which were
discussed above,"" further limit such deductions. In a subparagraph
of the regulations entitled "Coordination with other provisions," 1m the
Treasury Department removes some of this other interest from the
scope of section 163 regulations and attempts to create a hierarchy of
application in the event of overlaps between differing interest provisions. The "other interest provisions" governed by these coordination
rules are classified into several categories. First, disallowance provisions are those that disallow interest deduction for all taxable years.1
Provisions falling into this category are generally those such as section
265, which respond to the acquisition of assets with a permanently
tax-exempt as opposed to a tax-preferred yield.' 9° Such disallowance
rules will supersede section 163 allocation regulations.19
184. Id. § 1.163-8T()(4)(ii).
185. Id. § 1.163-8T(c)(4)(iii)(C). The Internal Revenue Service recently announced its intention to issue regulations extending this period to 30 days. I.R.S. Notice 88-20, 1988-9 I.R.B. 5-7.
186. Temp. Reg. § 1.163-ST(c)(4)(iii)(C) (1988).
187. See supra text Section III(A) accompanying notes 108-59.
188. Temp. Reg. § 1.163-8T(m) (1988).
189. Id. § 1.163-ST(m)(7)(ii).
190. See supra text Section III(A)(1) accompanying notes 108-32.
191. Temp. Reg. § 1.163-8T(m)(2)(i) (1987).
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A second major category of interest rules governed by other provisions are the capitalization provisions of sections 263(g), 263A(f),
and 266. These rules generally supersede section 163 rules. Section
263A, however, specifically excludes personal use property from uniform capitalization rules. 19 Because interest attributable to personal
expenditures is completely nondeductible, such interest clearly should
not be capitalized and amortized.
A third category includes deferral provisions that disallow interest
for any taxable year and are not disallowance or capitalization provisions. 93 One example of such a provision discussed earlier is section
267, which defers the deductibility of interest payments between related parties until the recipient has included the interest receipt in
income. The taxpayer must allocate interest attributable to such an
expenditure according to section 163 regulations. However, the taxpayer may not take the interest into account until the year the corresponding deduction is allowable.194
c. Critique
i) Complexity
The complexity of the new interest allocation regulations is daunting, and according to practitioners' comments received by the Service
may well "breed intentional and inadvertent non-compliance."1 95 Some
taxpayers will use complexity to manipulate the allocation rules in
their favor. Others simply will be trapped by the same complexities.
Financial dealings and accounts are likely to become more complex in
response to the new rules. Thus, increasing numbers of segregated
accounts for particular expenditures will be created.
To provide some relief, the Service should explore de minirnis
exceptions to the rules. For example, taxpayers with incomes below
a specified threshold might be allowed to opt for a simplified set of
rules. Empirical research results may suggest averages for proportionate interest costs attributable to particular expenditures for taxpayers
in different income classes. A taxpayer whose income fell below the
threshold could elect to use tables containing such averages for allocation purposes. Availability of optional interest allocation tables would

192. I.R.C. § 263A(c)(1) (1988); Temp. Reg. § 1.163-ST(m)(ii) (1987).
193. Temp. Reg. § 1.163-8T(m)(7)(iii) (1987). It should be noted that the use of the term
"deferral provisions" is quite narrow. Compare this author's use of a similar term in supra text
Section III(A)(2) accompanying notes 133-59.
194. Temp. Reg. § 1.163-ST(m)(1)(iii) (1987).
195. See, e.g., Berenson letter, supra note 170.
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relieve eligible taxpayers of tremendous recordkeeping burdens. 1 To
avoid abuse, the Treasury might prohibit taxpayers below the
threshold who have substantial investment income or interest in passive activities from using the simplified rules.
ii) Manipulation
Tracing as a method of interest allocation has one major weakness:
it encourages taxpayers to borrow when interest will be deductible
and use available cash for other expenditures. Tracing ignores the
basic fungibility of money. Direct tracing rules favor those taxpayers
with highly liquid investment portfolios. Cash can be used for personal
expenditures and borrowed funds used for business expenditures.
Moreover, consider a taxpayer contemplating an expenditure involving
nondeductible interest expense and holding an asset the acquisition of
which would give rise to deductible interest expense. The taxpayer
might dispose of the latter asset, use cash for the otherwise nondeductible expense, and immediately repurchase the asset disposed of or
another substantially similar asset.'9
The failure of the regulations to consider the use of property as
security for borrowed funds may provide incentive for additional manipulation. For example, a taxpayer might acquire a "nondeductible
interest asset" with cash and shortly thereafter use that asset as
collateral for a loan to acquire a "deductible interest asset."
Special anti-abuse rules might attack each of these manipulations.
Experience in tax shelters alone should illustrate that distinguishing
abusive and nonabusive tax behavior is quite difficult. The administration of such anti-abuse rules is likely to be quite burdensome.
Over the years, the Code has become increasingly complex. In
large part, this rise in complexity results from response to behavioral
patterns in which taxpayers discover a particular loophole. Congress
or the Treasury in turn closes the loophole with a provision designed
to curb a specific abuse. The current approach to interest may be
another dangerous step in this continuing pattern. Suggesting that it
too is concerned with this trend, the Service already has invited comments on possible methods of preventing abuse.19 A pro rata allocation

196. A similar proposal was made by a Task Force on Interest Deduction Regulations of
the American Bar Association Tax Section. Comments on Temporary and Proposed Regulations
on Allocation of Interest Expense (Dec. 17, 1987) (public comment to proposed § 163 regulations).
197. Of course, this strategy may not be sensible when transaction costs for disposing of
the "deductible interest" asset are high.
198. See T.D. 8145, 1987-2 C.B. 47, 50.
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formula would avoid manipulative behavior to fit borrowing within
deductible as opposed to nondeductible categories. Under such a formula, the additional complexity likely to be generated by anti-abuse
rules could also be avoided.
iii) Inconsistency
One strength of the section 163 regulations is that they address,
in one place, many of the complex interest limitations that are scattered throughout the Code. This collection of provisions simultaneously
displays the greatest weakness of the current approach to interest
allocation. Many of these provisions operate in different fashions. For
example, while section 163 regulations adopt one type of tracing rule,
section 265 has adopted another, and section 263A capitalization rules
adopt an "avoided cost" method. 199
Perhaps the most glaring inconsistency is the adoption of a pro
rata method under section 861 for purposes of determining United
States source income of multinationals while using a direct tracing
method under section 163. 20 Under section 861, the multinational taxpayer is required to use pro rata allocation, while a domestic taxpayer
with an identical United States operation must directly trace its debt
under section 163. 201 Moreover, the overlaps between the two sets of
rules leave some confusion. For example, should a United States taxpayer with worldwide income first determine its United States interest
through a pro rata formula and then proceed to further allocate interest
to specific items through some variation of a tracing method?

199. Compare discussion supra in text accompanying notes 179-86 (tracing rules under new
§ 163 regulations) with supra text accompanying notes 150-59 (uniform capitalization rules).
200. See supra text accompanying note 160. As a limited exception to the pro rata allocation
rule, the § 861 regulations permit allocation to specific property only when specified facts and
circumstances can be established. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(e)(2)(iv) (as amended in 1966). To use

this exception, the taxpayer must establish that indebtedness was incurred for and the proceeds
actually applied to the property in question, that the creditor look only to the specific property
as security, that the return from the specific property can be reasonably assumed to be sufficient

to fulfill the terms of the loan, and that there are restrictions on the disposal or use of the
specific property consistent with the latter two requirements. Id.
201. Foreign corporations with income "effectively connected with the conduct of a trade
or business within the United States" will also be subject to United States tax. I.R.C. § 882.
Another set of interest allocation rules applies to determine the proper allocation of deductions
to such effectively connected income. Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5 (as amended in 1984). For a discussion
of interest allocation principles applied to foreigners subject to United States tax, see
Rosenbloom, The Source of Interest Payments Made by Nonresidents, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 1023
(1984).
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In some circumstances, the particular goals driving an interest
limitation may call for one type of allocation method over another.
For example, the legislative history of section 265 indicates Congress's
intent to limit only interest expense incurred with a purpose to purchase or carry tax-exempt obligations. In this situation, a direct tracing
rule may be the most sensible. Nevertheless, absent such specific
goals, consistency should be the governing principle. Moreover,
perhaps the time has come to re-examine the notion of purpose in
connection with interest deduction limitations. If arbitrage activity is
undertaken and income is thereby mismeasured, should not Congress
restrict such activity regardless of purpose? Some interest limitation
provisions impose this "purpose" test and others do not. Congress
should carefully examine and eliminate unnecessary inconsistencies.
IV.

ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE TREATMENT OF
INTEREST IN THE NEW WORLD

A.

Sheltering Left Untouched

As noted above, the deduction of interest expense incurred in connection with tax-preferred investments generates arbitrage advantages for the taxpayer. Assets that will not be subject to tax on
unrealized appreciation or which are entitled to accelerated deductions
are themselves advantages. Borrowing to acquire such assets magnifies the advantages. The increasing number of provisions limiting
interest deductions attest to Congress's acceptance of this observation.
If the arbitrage observation is accurate, it should be equally so for
businesses that acquire such tax-preferred assets. Nevertheless, the
bulk of the interest limitation rules do not apply to interest expense
incurred in connection with a trade or business in which the taxpayer
materially participates." The uniform capitalization rules of section
263A apply to, and in fact are limited to, business activity. Section
263A, however, deals primarily with timing of interest deductions or
time arbitrage. 20 The problem of rate arbitrage in the trade or business
context is left untouched.2 4 It may be sacrilegious to suggest that
Congress impose limitations on trade or business interest. Nevertheless, if exclusions from the tax base create trouble with interest requiring response in the investment context, consistency requires a similar
response in the trade or business context as well.

202. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 163(d)(4), 163(h)(2)(A), 469(c).
203. See supm text accompanying notes 150-59.
204. For a definition of rate arbitrage as used for purposes of this article, see supra text
accompanying notes 39-40.
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In exploring the possibility of extending interest limitations to the
trade or business context, one may wonder whether the straightforward event of borrowing to meet current expenses introduces arbitrage problems. A simple example is the business that borrows to meet
its payroll costs. The payroll cost is deductible as a section 162 ordinary
and necessary business expense, and interest on the loan may be
deductible under section 163. Thus, the taxpayer may receive two
sets of deductions before he or she incurs out of pocket expense for
payroll cost. In a concurring opinion in a Fifth Circuit case involving
section 264, Judge Thornberry posited the following hypothetical:
For example, if I ran a business and needed cash to meet
my payroll; I went to the bank and borrowed $10,000 at 10%
per annum; I paid my employees; then I repaid the bank a
total of $11,000; I assume that I would be entitled to deduct
$10,000 under § 162 (the trade or business deduction) and
$1000 under § 163 (the interest deduction).2o5
Surely, the assumed answer in the hypothetical is correct; the
taxpayer should be entitled to deduct the business expense and the
interest cost incurred in connection with paying it. The more difficult
question relates to the timing of the deductions. Should the taxpayer
be entitled to deduct both expenditures before repaying the loan?
As an example, assume that a business taxpayer borrows $1000
at 8 percent interest in order to meet immediate and legitimate payroll
expenses. The terms of the loan call for yearly payment of $80 in
interest with the entire principal due in a balloon payment in year
ten. Under current law, the borrowed funds would not enter into
income, the $1000 payroll expense would be deductible under section
162 in year one, and the $80 interest payments would be deductible
each year. Repayment of the principal in year ten would have no
further tax consequence.
Present law thus permits the taxpayer a double deduction before
he or she has incurred an out of pocket expense. This opportunity
is not a result of a particular tax preference that causes income
to be taxed at lower effective rates.2 Does this opportunity provide

205.

American Body & Equip. Co. v. United States, 511 F.2d 647, 650 (5th Cir. 1975)

(Thornberry, J., concurring).
206. There may be some element of tax preference or rate arbitrage occurring here, however. Because distinctions between current and capital expenditures are often difficult to make,
there may well be expenses currently deductible under § 162 that are not yet generating ordinary
income. Thus, for example, salary expense may be going toward development of a future product.
For a recent case that has struggled with such distinctions, see Encyclopedia Britannica v.

Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1982).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1988

55

Florida Law
Vol.
40,REVIEW
Iss. 4 [1988], Art. 3
UNIVERSITY
OFReview,
FLORIDA
LAW

[Vol. ,40

undue tax advantage such that interest deductions should be limited?
At first blush, simultaneous deductions of interest and the expense
itself are apparently advantageous. On closer examination, however,
the borrower is no better off than a similarly situated cash investor.
Assume, for example, that two taxpayers, A and B, each begin
with $10,000 of available cash capital. A chooses to use $1,000 of this
cash to meet deductible payroll expenses, thus foregoing interest
earned on the $1,000. At 8 percent, A will earn $720 in interest on
the remaining $9,000. A is thus left with $9,720 in before-tax dollars.
Assuming a tax rate of 28 percent, A is left with $9,518 after-tax
dollars at year end before taking the business expense deduction into
account. 20 B, on the other hand, retains the cash and instead borrows

$1,000 at 8 percent interest. B's interest income for the year is $800.
Because the investment and borrowing are at the same rate, the
excess interest income of $80 is precisely offset by the $80 of interest
expense, leaving B with $10,720. The $1,000 payroll is presumably
fully "wasted" during the taxable year with no remaining useful life
or value. If B repays the $1,000 principal at year end, B similarly is
left with $9,518 after-tax dollars before taking the business expense
deduction into account. 2 8 Parity in after-tax income can only be
achieved here if B is entitled to deduct the interest expense. Under
these circumstances, limiting B's interest deduction is inappropriate.
In the case of a fully deductible business expense for an otherwise
non-tax-preferred asset, B's borrowing does not provide a tax advantage. Where the taxpayer incurs the expense in connection with a
tax-preferred asset, however, a combination of the tax preference
with deductible interest expense may create a tax benefit to the debtor
in a borrowing transaction.
Assume in the above example that instead of spending $1,000 on
a fully deductible business expense, A and B each spend $1,000 for
an asset appreciating at 8 percent per year. After acquiring the appreciating asset, the cash investor has $9,000 that generates $720 in
interest income. At year end, A has $9,518 after-tax dollars.0 In
contrast, B retains the full $10,000 earning $800 in interest income.

207. This assumes that the $10,000 of original capital was previously subject to tax, and a
tax of $202 was imposed on interest income ($720 x .28).

208.

This again assumes that the $10,000 of original capital was previously taxed and that

a tax of $224 was imposed on interest income ($80 x .28), and a deduction worth $2,240 ($80 x
.28) was available for interest expense.
209. The computation here is identical to the one used earlier except that there will be no
business expense deduction. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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One might be tempted to say, as in the above example, that B's
additional $80 in interest income is offset by $80 in interest expense.
Unlike the "wasted payroll" in the above example, however, B has
acquired a lasting asset that will generate future income. Allowing a
deduction for interest as a cost of generating such income in advance
of receiving it is inappropriate.
Taxpayer B might argue that the borrowing enabled her to invest
an additional $1,000 in an interest bearing account and that the appreciating asset was acquired with cash. If this is so, perhaps the $80
in interest income should be offset by the $80 interest expense. As
discussed earlier, 210 this type of argument reveals the primary reason
that the trouble with interest is so unique. Interest expense incurred
in connection with investments not yet generating taxable income
should not be deductible. To determine which expenditure is carried
by the interest expense is a difficult task, however. Under a comprehensive pro rata allocation formula, B's borrowing would be deemed
to carry all assets and investments. Only a portion of interest deduction
would be deferred. Despite administrative difficulties, the author prefers this method as the most theoretically sound.211
The preceding debt versus equity business expense examples illustrate that in extending interest limitations to the trade or business
context, one should stop short of imposing limits on interest incurred
in connection with ordinary and necessary business expenses. On the
other hand, to the extent that active businesses engage in tax arbitrage, consistency of approach suggests that interest limitations be
extended. What makes this proposal sacrilegious is the fact that many
tax preferences were introduced to stimulate particular investments
or economic behavior. If the preference is no longer warranted, the
proper response is to eliminate it. Interest limitations are admittedly
an inferior solution to the problem. If limitations are to be applied,
however, they should be consistently applied to all taxpayers involved
in arbitrage. If limitations are not consistently applied, then the
reasons for inconsistency should be made explicit.
B.

Movement Toward a Cash-Flow Treatment of Borrowing

As section III illustrated, Congress has increasingly added Code
provisions that deny or suspend interest deductions. This development
moving the tax treatment of borrowing in the direction of a consumption tax21 ironically comes at a time when the tax base is broadening
210.
211.
212.

See supra text accompanying notes 12-18, 36-40 & 46-107.
See supra text accompanying notes 160-70.
This article uses the terms consumption tax and cash-flow tax synonymously.
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in the direction of a purer income tax. Because borrowing has historically been treated according to an income tax model while many
investment items have been treated according to a consumption model,
these movements may cause the system to rest more comfortably in
the hybrid middle.
Under an accretion model income tax, borrowed funds are not
included in the borrower's income. Interest payments are deductible
while repayment of principal is not. If all forms of income, including
accrued but unrealized appreciation and imputed income are included
in the tax base, full deductibility of interest expense is theoretically
appropriate. Because our system is somewhat less than a pure accretion tax, however, and excludes many forms of income from the tax
base, Congress has provided that some interest is deductible and some
is not.

213

Under a cash-flow borrowing model, in contrast, the borrower
includes all receipts from borrowing in income in the year of receipt
and deducts all principal and interest payments in the years repaid.
The latter approach is the standard treatment of borrowing transactions generally provided for in most consumption tax models. 214 All

receipts (borrowed or otherwise) under a cash-flow tax are subject to
tax unless invested or saved.
In an article on the viability of a consumption tax, Professor William
Andrews spoke of sheltering opportunities available under the current
tax system through borrowing to purchase appreciating assets not
subject to taxation until later resale. As a possible response to such
sheltering, he suggested that "[e]ven under our existing tax the best
way to limit the abuse of tax shelters might well be to adopt [cash-flow]
: * . accounting for loan proceeds, in certain circumstances at least,
in an effort to achieve a hybrid treatment of the investment that the
loan proceeds help finance." 21 In effect, the proliferation of interest de-

See supra text accompanying notes 46-159.
See, e.g., D. BRADFORD AND THE U.S. TREAS. TAX POLICY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS
FOR BAsIc TAx REFORM 111-13 (2d. ed. 1984) [hereinafter BLUEPRINTS]; Andrews, Consumption Tax, supra note 89, at 1137, 1153-54 (describing cash flow accounting for business and
213.

214.

investment loans). In this article, Professor Andrews proposes inclusion of borrowed funds and
deductions of repayments for business and investment loans. He suggests simply leaving consumer loans out of account. Id.
215. Andrews, Consumption Tax, supra note 89, at 1137. Later in the article, he states:
"Even if the tax treatment of investments generally is not put on a pure cash-flow basis, a
cash-flow treatment of loans in excess of basis in related assets would probably represent the
best and most comprehensive practical way to deal with tax shelter abuses under present law."
Id. at 1154 n.96.
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nial and suspension provisions achieved such hybrid treatment. In each
case, Congress identified a particular 'tax preference" or tax shelter
and responded with an interest limitation. As indicated in the sections
above that describe gaps in the tax base contributing to the trouble
with interest, most gaps can be viewed as at least a partial consumption
tax treatment of particular investments. To require parallel consumption-like treatment on the borrowing side of such transactions is quite
sensible.
At first blush, it may not be obvious that denial or suspension of
interest deductions reflects consumption treatment of borrowing. Typically, such treatment calls for inclusion of borrowed funds with later
deductions for both principal and interest. Tax theorists have established that treatment roughly equivalent to the inclusion/full deduction
216
model can be achieved by simply denying interest deductions.
Economists and tax theorists have posited that a cash-flow tax permitting immediate deduction for investment expenditures is the equivalent
of exempting investment yields from taxation. This notion is simply
the outgrowth of basic present value analysis. 217 If the present value
of an asset is equal to the discounted value of its future stream of
earnings, then immediate deduction of such value is equivalent to
simply not taxing the future income stream. One can view a borrowing
transaction as simply the flip side of an investment transaction. If the
immediate deduction-yield equivalence holds 218 on the borrowing as
well as the investment side of the transaction, then cash-flow treatment of borrowing should be equivalent to denial of an interest deduction. In short, a cash-flow treatment of borrowing might be achieved
by simply denying a deduction for interest paid.

This method was suggested in BLUEPRINTS, supra note 214, at 111-12. The BLUEmodel consumption tax provided for an election by the taxpayer to either take borrowed
funds as income and later deduct principal and interest repayments, or to simply disallow the
interest deduction.
217. Discovery of the immediate deduction, yield exemption equivalence, is generally attributed to E. Brown, Business-Income Taxation andInvestment Incentives, in INCOME, EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALVIN H. HANSEN 300-16 (1948). The
concept is used quite heavily in consumption tax literature. See, e.g., BLUEPRINTS, supranote
214 (using equivalence to discuss alternative treatments of loan transactions); Andrews, Consumption Tax, supra note 89; Warren, Consumption Tax, supra note 89, at 1081 (comparing
consumption and income tax systems). For a critique of the immediate-deduction/yield exemption
analysis as applied in BLUEPRINTS, see Graetz, supra note 92, at 1598-1611.
218. Some commentators have critiqued the supposed equivalence by challenging the assumptions on which it is based. See, e.g., Graetz, supranote 92, at 1598-1611 (ex post equivalence
of immediate-deduction and yield exemption depends on a set of five unrealistic conditions and
will produce different distributional consequences). For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 223-25.
216.

PRINTS
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To illustrate, assume that the taxpayer borrows $1000 with principal payable at the end of year ten and 8 percent interest due each
year in the interim. Assume further that the taxpayer is in the 28
percent bracket. If under the cash-flow model, borrowed funds are
included as income in year one, the taxpayer will have $720 after-tax
dollars to invest. Principal and interest payments will be deductible
as they are made so that the after-tax present value of the taxpayer's
repayment obligation is also $720.219
If instead of the basic cash-flow treatment, the taxpayer's borrowed
funds are initially excluded from income but interest deductions are
later denied, then the taxpayer will have $1000 after-tax dollars available initially. In contrast to the cash-flow treatment described above,
the taxpayer would have $280 additional dollars to invest. If invested
at 8 percent, this amount would generate an additional $22.40 in interest income each year. Under a cash-flow tax, this additional yield
is not taxable if immediately re-invested. The loss of the interest
deduction worth $22.40 each year would precisely offset the additional
interest income, creating a "wash." Thus, the taxpayer theoretically
should be indifferent as between the two treatments posited above.
Stated another way, although the taxpayer has received $1000 aftertax dollars for investment, the present value of the now nondeductible
repayment obligation is similarly $1000. Any initial advantage is offset
by denial of the interest deduction. Prompted by the equivalence between the above two approaches to borrowing, the Treasury staff in
its 1977 Blueprints ° suggested as part of its consumption tax proposal

219.

If the $1000 principal repayment is deductible in year 10 and the taxpayer is still in

the 28% bracket, the after tax repayment obligation in year 10 is $720. Using an 8% discount
rate, the present value of this obligation is approximately $330. If interest is deductible as paid,
then the after tax repayment obligation is approximately $57.60 per year ($80 payment less tax
value of deduction ($80 x .28)). Using the same discount rate, the present value of this obligation
stream is approximately $390.
220. See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 214, at 110-12. The Treasury Department staff here
asserts that the "consequences to the government of the two ways of taxing the purchase of
assets would also be the same in present value terms." Id. at 110 (emphasis in original). Similar
observations are made in the borrowing context. Id. at 111-12. In the examples used in text,

the present value from the taxpayers perspective is not precisely the same. With the first
approach, the taxpayer is left with $720 and an obligation to repay the present value of $720.
Under the alternative treatment, the taxpayer is left with $1000 and an obligation to repay the
present value of $1000. Nevertheless, the 'income" to the taxpayer and the corresponding "tax

take" of the government is the same in either case. From a "present value" perspective, the
transaction is simply a "wash" resulting in no income or deductions to the taxpayer and no tax
receipts for the government.
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that taxpayers be allowed to elect either to include borrowed funds
and take later principal and interest deductions or to exclude borrowed
funds from income and to forego later interest deductions. Nevertheless, intuition leads one to conclude that exclusion of borrowed funds in
the first place would be the taxpayer's preferred approach. General
tax wisdom regarding the advantages of deferral suggests that one is
generally better off taking deductions or exclusions earlier rather than
later.
The above example assumes, however, that the taxpayer under
the exclusion approach would earn an 8 percent return on the additional
$280. In reality, however, investment returns will fluctuate. The taxpayer may earn more or less than 8 percent. If, in the end, the return
exceeds 8 percent, the tax-payer who opted for the exclusion/no deduction approach will be better off than the taxpayer who opted for the
inclusion/full deduction approach. If, on the other hand, the ultimate
return is less than 8 percent, then the taxpayer would have been
better off with the inclusion/full deduction approach.
Moreover, the above example assumes that the tax rate will remain
constant over the ten year period involved. This will not necessarily
be the case under a system of graduated rates. In addition, even if
the tax system changed to a flat rate, any later legislative changes
in the "flat" rate would cause the alternatives to give rise to different
tax results.
The Treasury staff acknowledged these problems in Blueprints.21
As a response, the staff suggested that electivity not be permitted
under certain circumstances.- In his article concerning implementation of a progressive consumption tax, Professor Graetz criticized the
Blueprints electivity proposal on several grounds and elaborated on
the particular problems posed by Blueprint's apparent "ex ante approach to tax parity.' ' According to Professor Graetz, "[w]henever
persons are in equivalent circumstances ex ante, the Treasury Department would apparently ignore differences in circumstances ex post."224
221. Id. at 115-17. The staff points out, however, that the problem is less significant under
a proportionate, as opposed to a graduated, tax. Id. at 116. If this is so, the problem is lessened
as tax rates are "flattened."
222. For example, the staff states that, "One possible treatment addressing uncertain

returns but not uncertain tax rates, would be to force all 'speculative' investments, i.e., land,
stocks, etc., to be purchased through qualified accounts but to allow the tax-prepayment option
for fixed'interest securities and savings deposits." Id. at 116-17. In addition, the staff proposes
that 'Investments in individual businesses would be eligible only for tax treatment on a current
cash-flow basis." Id.
223. Graetz, supra note 92, at 1600.
224. Id. at 1600-01 (discusses the horizontal and vertical equity problems created by an ex

ante approach). Professor Graetz further points out that given the specific examples used in
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Simply choosing one of two alternatives and making it mandatory
solves some of the problems described above. At a minimum, it puts
all taxpayers on the proverbial "level playing field" and avoids some
of the otherwise inevitable taxpayer planning for maximum tax advantage by treating some transactions under the inclusion/full deduction
approach and others under the exclusion/no deduction approach. Opting for the exclusion/no deduction approach at least rewards and encourages those who expect to gain from speculative investments.
In the hypothetical above, for example, if the taxpayer borrows
at 8 percent interest and is able to invest at a 15 percent return, the
exclusion/no deduction alternative provides an additional $280 to invest
at 15 percent. This results in an additional $42.50 in interest income
per year above what the taxpayer would have invested under the
inclusion/full deduction alternative. What the taxpayer gave up by
taking the exclusion/no deduction alternative is only a $22.40 interest
deduction each year. Thus, the taxpayer is ahead by $20.10 per year.
In contrast, under the inclusion/full deduction model, the taxpayer of
course would recoup the $280 through the deduction in year ten of
the $1000 principal repayment. In the meantime, however, he or she
has lost the advantage of the additional 7 percent on $280 that could
have been earned on the more successful investment.
Reversing the facts of the above example, what would be the
results of an unsuccessful investment in which the taxpayer borrows
at 8 percent and is able to earn only 5 percent on the investment?
With the extra $280 left untaxed at the outset, the taxpayer would
earn an additional $14 per year. For this additional amount, however,
the taxpayer has given up a $22.40 interest deduction. The taxpayer
would have been better off with the inclusion/full deduction method.

BLUEPRINTS, the immediate deduction/yield exemption equivalence does hold ex post as well
as ex ante. Id. at 1601-02. This is due, however, to the following unrealistic assumptions made
in the Treasury study(1) Tax rates are not progressive; moreover, they do not change over time.
(2) Taxpayers have no accumulated wealth when the system is first introduced.
(3) The system is closed; either the taxpayer exhausts his wealth by death, the
system classifies all remaining capital balances (all bequests) as being consumption
in the taxpayer's final return, or an identical tax is subsequently imposed on
bequests in some other manner.
(4) There exists a perfect capital market with no uncertainty; all taxpayers can
borrow and lend unlimited amounts at a risk-free interest rate.
(5) All income can be classified as one of two types: wage income or income to
capital accumulated during and after the initial period.

Id. at 1602.
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Another way of describing the exclusion/no deduction alternative
is that it excludes the borrowing transaction from tax consideration.
This is certainly a more simple approach than the inclusion/full deduction method. It causes less immediate hardship on the taxpayer than
the inclusion/full deduction approach while serving similar goals from
a tax policy point of view. In making a choice as to which of the two
cash-flow methods ought to be used, however, one is faced then with
the question of whether to reward the risk-taker in the event of a
lucky gamble or to protect the investor who with hindsight has invested less wisely. If forced to choose between a method that rewards
successful undertakings or protects against unsuccessful undertakings,
the former would arguably be preferable because it provides incentives
for investment. 2 The simplicity of the exclusion/no deduction alternative to traditional cash-flow borrowing is appealing in the pure consumption tax
world. But what of the hybrid income tax world in which we live?
Complexities arise in using the no deduction approach for some assets
but not for others. As noted above, the taxpayer must allocate interest
to numerous categories, some of which will give rise to deductions
and others of which will not.
The Blueprints electivity approach suggests an alternative to the
current interest limitations, however. Instead of limiting interest deductions, Congress might provide for selective inclusion of borrowed
amounts for those taxpayers who engage in specified types of arbitrage
in tax-preferred investments. Or, perhaps in lieu of interest limitation
provisions, the Code could allow taxpayers to elect partial inclusion
of borrowed amounts. Allocation rules would still be necessary to
determine the amount of income to be included, however.
V.

CONCLUSION

The trouble with interest is two-fold and includes issues of both
time and rate arbitrage. The latter reflects troubles inherent in the
current tax base with all of its gaps. Most attention is focused on rate
arbitrage. Sections 163(d), 465, and 469 are but few of the many Code
sections promulgated to address such problems. A careful look at the
trouble with interest uncovers the additional timing problem. Although
the section 263A capitalization rules begin to address this problem,
they do so in a limited fashion. Over the years, the Code has become

225. If evidence suggested that investors were extremely risk-adverse, however, a different
choice might be called for.
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increasingly more sophisticated in properly considering questions of
timing. A closer look at these problems is called for in the context of
borrowing transactions.
Time and rate arbitrage are related problems with related solutions. Consistency of approach to such tax problems is essential. Congress has been adding new and different interest limitation provisions
to the Code at an alarming rate. It has done so without much attention
to consistency of approach to borrowing transactions or to the overlapping jurisdictions among numerous provisions. Most important,
perhaps, Congress has left arbitrage activity in the trade or business
context virtually untouched by recent reforms. Although it may be
sacrilegious even to suggest it, in the absence of further reforms
eliminating gaps in the tax base, interest limitations should be extended to cover trade or business borrowing.
Congress has already identified many items of tax preference in
connection with the alternative minimum tax.226 A similar list could
be used to develop a uniform statute dealing with interest deductions.
The 'tax preferences" resulting in special treatment of borrowing
should include all those currently the subject of special interest limitations as well as additional provisions designed to capture currently
untouched arbitrage activity. Unfortunately, this approach cannot
avoid the complexity of debt allocation. It will still be necessary to
determine which borrowing should be subject to limitation and which
should not. For this purpose, a pro rata formula for allocation of
interest expense would do far better than the tracing system proposed
in recent regulations issued by the Treasury Department.
To combine all interest deduction limitations in one place and make
them subject to one uniform set of allocation rules with limited exceptions for special cases would be a tremendous improvement. Care
should be exercised in identifying tax preferences subject to interest
limitation. Some preferences, particularly those enacted as incentives
to engage in particular economic behavior, may be so important that
the system will tolerate extension of incentive through leveraged investment in such activity. In other cases, the system may not be
prepared to tolerate such extension.
Complexity is particularly a problem in a hybrid system that fits
neither the ideal consumption model nor the ideal accretion model.
Given the limitations of such a hybrid system, recent reforms regarding interest deductions are generally admirable. What is needed now
is a careful examination of the many interest limitations provisions

226.

See I.R.C. § 57.
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with a view toward eliminating inconsistencies of approach, except
where warranted by elaborated tax policy considerations. Moreover,
Congress should make continuing efforts to eliminate those gaps in
the tax base that add to the trouble with interest. As the lawmakers
eliminate each of these gaps, they may also repeal interest limitations
enacted in response to those gaps.
Unfortunately, complexity has become a way of tax life. Nevertheless, complexity that is centralized in one set of uniform rules is more
tolerable than the scattered complexity of existing statutes that deal
directly or indirectly with interest. Undoubtedly, the search for a
uniform and workable set of rules for proper treatment of borrowing
transactions will continue.
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